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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the impact of democratic institutions amongst the Asian 
developing countries. There has been debate about the successful economic rise 
of these seven countries; however, questions remain over the differing levels of 
economic performance. Institutional literature has paid scant attention to the role 
of democracy, and how this has influenced economic development throughout 
Asia. This thesis explores the relationships between four democratic institutions – 
cabinets, party-systems, electoral systems and bicameralism – and economic 
performance across six developing democracies, in addition to Japan. Using 
current democratic institutional literature derived from OECD countries, this 
thesis expands the scope to include new countries. The analysis employs both 
statistical methods and case studies to assess the relationships between four 
democratic institutions and seven socio-economic indicators between 1986 and 
2005. The linear regressions provided evidence that coalition cabinets are 
correlated with lower levels of inflation and unemployment, but large multi-party 
legislatures are not. This thesis also found correlations between strong second 
legislative chambers and higher FDI, lower tariffs and higher income inequality. 
Although this is an exploratory thesis, I suggest that democratic institutional 
analysis within Asia does warrant further examination; an assessment of the 
specific institutions may provide us with clearer notions regarding economic 
development. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
 
“…the large difference in per capita income across countries cannot be explained by differences in access 
to the world’s stock of productive knowledge or to its capital markets, by difference in the ration of 
population to land or natural resources, or by difference in the quality of marketable human capital or 
personal culture … the great differences in the wealth of nations are mainly due to differences in the quality 
of their institutions and economic policies.”  
 
Mancur Olson “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and 
Others Poor”  (1996: 176) 
 
The economic story of Asian states along the Pacific Rim is an intriguing tale of 
states transforming themselves into financial and industrial giants. Through initial 
success, apparent failure during the Asian economic crisis of 1998 and now back 
to steady positive growth, no other region has experienced systematic economic 
development like East Asia. However, their recent economic development has 
not occurred in a vacuum:  most of the East Asian “tiger” economies have 
simultaneously transformed into democracies1. But to what extent has 
democracy influenced the disparate rates of growth? Current political and 
economic scholarly work has focused on the presumption that economic success 
has arisen in those states due to adoption of fundamental neoclassical economic 
tenets by their authoritarian political regimes; that is, authoritarian regimes 
                                                 
1
 Many of these countries, with the exception of Japan, are classic examples of Huntington’s (1991) Third 
Wave of Democratisation . 
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successfully imposed conditions which permitted economic growth. However 
economic success has also arisen in nascent democracies (See World Bank 
1993). I contend that Olson’s (1996) statement regarding the presence of 
institutions is crucial to the understanding of consequent economic performances 
within these developing Asian democracies. Without an analysis of the 
interrelationship between democratic institutions and economic growth, the East 
Asian economic success cannot be understood.  
 
Democracy, simply put, consists of freely-contested elections, where those 
elections are used to select the government. It is an open competition between 
diverse interests, organizations and opinions, with periodic winners and losers 
(Przeworski 1991: 10). Governed by rules and regulations, these interests pursue 
courses that reflect the will of the majority propagating a perpetual system of 
continual conflicts “in which outcomes depend on what participants do but no 
single force controls what occurs” (Przeworski 1991: 12). Within the political 
realm it is seldom anticipated to what extent divergent stances can be resolved 
or mediated, nor is it unavoidable. As such, Przeworski recognises that 
democracy acknowledges uncertainty, insofar as participants can expect certain 
outcomes but not particular outcomes.  For this reason democracy is good at 
protecting all interests, because there remains the possibility that at a future 
election those interests may be in the majority and simultaneously be respected 
(Przeworski 1991: 12). Indeed this open competition coupled with adequate 
incentive permits political stability to facilitate economic growth. 
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“… a stable democracy requires that governments be strong enough to govern 
effectively but weak enough not to be able to govern against important interests.” 
(Przeworski 1991: 37) 
 
Although there is no consensus about a causal link between liberal democracy 
and economic development, there is however evidence to suggest that is high 
correlation between the two phenomena.  
 
Much current research concerns comparative studies done with developed 
industrialised democracies and with post-Communist countries. There is also a 
literature that examines the role of democracy within Latin America; however, 
there is relatively little that is concerned with the emergence of a variety of 
different democracies in Asia, and in particular their effects on their respective 
economies (See Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Blondel 1999). What research that 
does exist about East Asia looks broadly at the at the holistic effect on 
democracy and economic development, particularly in regards to other 
authoritarian governments (Rodrik 2000)2. Whilst informative, I contend that it 
does little explain the variation of performances between rather similar countries 
that are democratic.  
 
                                                 
2
 MacIntyre (2001) however, does examine the effect of democratic institutions in four Southeast Asian 
countries during the 1998 Financial Crisis. 
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I argue that political choices do affect socio-economic outcomes. This argument 
follows closely to that outlined by Heo and Tan (2003) in their evaluation of the 
differing responses of South Korea and Taiwan to the Asian Financial Crisis, 
whom in turn focus on Haggard’s (1990) conclusions about the role of political 
institutions in economic outcomes (See Gourevitch 1986). Essentially this paper 
proposed that development and the state’s response to sharp economic 
downturns are a result of their respective political institutions. I propose to extend 
the premise to specifically democratic procedural institutions across seven similar 
countries; Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand. 
 
This thesis will attempt to explain which types of democracy are associated with 
economic performances within South-East and East Asia. The democratic 
traditions and subsequent economic development of the countries are focussed 
on, as are differences in their various types of institutions.  Such an approach 
has useful explanatory power but also permits cross-national studies of variations 
of political and economic performance (Remmer 1997; Roland 2004).  Due to the 
limited amount of current literature pertaining to this specific analysis I am 
undertaking an exploratory approach to this research. Before making detailed 
analyses into the economic implications of a particular institution, it is important 
to examine whether there are relationships that warrant further evaluation. This 
thesis attempts to broadly evaluate the validity of further research by examining 
the direct or indirect impact of these institutions within each country using a 
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range of common and new socio-economic indicators. This thesis simplifies 
several apparently mutually exclusive sets of variables, democratic political 
institutions and socio-economic indicators; whilst this may reduce validity it 
necessarily enhances the feasibility of conducting any research pertaining to 
democracy3. The general aim is to explore, albeit crudely, potential relationships 
between nascent democratic institutions and socio-economic performance 
indicators. 
 
What is an Institution? 
 
An “institution” in political science terms is much broader than the common 
definition; while most people would consider formal organisations or bodies such 
as a parliament, a university, a bank or even a large company to be an 
“institution”, political scientists define institutions as imposing constraints on 
behaviour. North (1990: 3) defines an “institution” as  “constraining the behaviour 
of individuals by the ‘rules of the game’“4. Dunning and Pop-Eleches (2004: 6) 
expand it further “sets of formal, rule-based constraints on the behaviour (sic) of 
individual and collective actors”5. Weaver and Rockman (1993: 118-9) espouse a 
similar idea:  
 
                                                 
3
 Research into the effects of democracy in regards to economics often turns into discussion of definitions 
of democracy, although these are pertinent discussions it avoids the important research at hand. 
4
 This differs from organisations which are people that work within the institutions or ‘rules of the game’.  
5
 However, there is also an alternative view that contends that institutions have a wider definition. Cultural 
values, beliefs and informal rules and customs are considered by theorists as being intuitive towards the 
functioning of an institution. However, there is little to suggest how to operationalise these alternative 
fields and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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“Firstly, the most common claim is that institutions determine the capacity of government to 
legislate and implement policies (originally italicised). A second claim is that institutions determine the 
strategies of political and economic actors by virtue of the opportunities and constraints that they provide. 
Third, historical institutionalists commonly assert that institutions determine the distribution of power 
among political or economic actors. And finally, we are often told that institutions matter in an even more 
profound sense: They determine who the actors are and/or how the actors conceive their interests.” 
          
 
Democratic Institutions and Economic Performance 
 
This thesis contends that democratic institutions do have an effect on countries’ 
economic performance. Whilst there is no conclusive evidence to suggest which 
specie of democratic institution causes a specific effect, there is a body of 
literature that affirms that democratic institutions generally do affect economic 
performance – albeit positive or negative influence (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; 
Helliwell 1994; Alesina, Ozler et al. 1996; Aron 2000)6. Further, many surmise 
that institutions themselves do not necessarily directly affect performance but 
create the settings for which development can occur. Democratic institutions may 
not directly create growth, but are (at the least) an important antecedent for 
growth. Qian and Weingast (1997) adjudged that economies require, in addition 
to sound economic policies, stable political commitments (See Clague, Keefer et 
al. 1996). In other words growth is not simply an aggregation of factor 
endowments, but a combination of rules, constraints, and freedoms – manifested 
                                                 
6Prezeworski and Limongi (1993) go further, suggesting that there is not direct correlation between 
democracy and economic performance. 
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in democratic institutions, economic policies and the market.  Likewise, Feng 
(1997) promotes the notion that although no direct correlation is apparent, an 
indirect relationship through political stability does affect long-term economic 
performance. Rodrik (2000: 5) considers the role of political institutions as not 
necessarily directly affecting economic performance but rather establishing 
political stability through good governance; these are referred to as “market-
supporting institutions”.   
 
An alternative theory suggests that the aggregation of human capital, in addition 
to sound economic policies, are factors much more important to successful 
economic performance than are democratic institutions (Glaeser, Porta et al. 
2004). However this research regressed institutional quality against measures of 
human capital –in this instance education enrolment levels –and an independent 
variable of economic growth. In an attempt to elicit a relationship between 
institutions and growth, or human capital (via education enrolment levels) and 
growth, this research conducted two tests and found that there was no clear 
relationship for institutions, but there was a significant relationship for human 
capital.   
 
The Asian Experience 
 
In the present case, however, it’s clear from distinction that the Asian 
democracies have all enjoyed large aggregations of human capital but with 
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differing results (World Bank 1993).  This suggests that Glaeser and Porta’s 
methodology may not adequately explain the growth patterns in these countries.  
Indeed I contend that the presence of democratic institutions provides adequate 
incentive to foster economic development, and this is also confirmed by Persson 
(2004). Rodrik’s (2000) analysis on the effect of democratic institutions and long-
term performance suggested that there is a positive but not a robust correlation7. 
However, Rodrik’s GDP data is only for the period 1970-89, and does not provide 
the information for the past 17 years. There is no existing literature that attempts 
to explain the direct relationships between specific institutions and socio-
economic performance indicators. 
 
The Rest of the Thesis 
 
The purpose of this research is to determine which variety of democratic 
institutions is correlated with economic performance; I contend that the presence 
of particular types of institution affects the development, and hence performance, 
within nascent democracies in East Asia. Before this primary question can be 
answered, I examined the viability of research (derived largely from data relating 
to industrialised democracies) in regards to explaining developing democracies. 
Chapter Two examines the institutions themselves, and in particular looks at the 
current political-economic literature pertaining to the relationships between 
                                                 
7
 Controlling for initial income, education, and regional effects, the partial correlation proves that although 
democracy can provide performance it is not significant. However, it must be remembered that this analysis 
was an attempt to regress a sample of political regimes both including, free, semi-free, and autocratic 
governments. 
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institutions and socio-economic performance. In addition, I attempt to test the 
hypothesised relationships by including further socio-economic variables, 
specifically those pertinent to Asia’s economic development. Chapter Three 
explains the data and method for this thesis and introduces each institution and 
performance indicator and how they are measured; importantly, this section also 
details the statistical method employed in the subsequent chapter. The analysis 
section, Chapter Four, implements the cross-national statistical approach of the 
previous chapter. Essentially this is a regression exercise, looking to find 
correlations, or a lack thereof, between the four nominated institution types and 
the seven performance indicators.  However, I also describe the relationships 
between the two groups and go into greater detail than simply assessing the 
significance of the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables. Chapter Five concludes the analysis, reviewing the new and 
interesting relationships and suggests avenues for further research.  
 
The timing of the research bears down on contemporary political issues, in 
particular the creation and subsequent failures and successes of a spate of new 
democracies. However there have been few academic analyses of these nascent 
Asian democracies, little work examining their democratic institutions, and thus 
this thesis seeks to expand the scope of existing literature in an attempt to 
understand institutional effects on economic growth within a nascent democracy.  
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Chapter Two – Democratic Institutions and their effect on 
Economic Performance 
 
Growth, according to Olson (1996), is the product of a relationship between 
institutions and economic policies. Olson is certainly correct to suggest that these 
three are interrelated but what is not clear is the exact relationship between 
institutions, economic policy and (in this instance) economic performance. Neo-
institutionalists contend that political/constitutional structures are essential to 
policy change and indeed specific economic outcomes, stressing the importance 
of viewing “the structures of constitutional democracy as major promoters or 
inhibitors of radical policy change” (Schmidt 1996: 175). Any major policy is 
constrained by the nature of the political institution in place  (Haggard 1990; Heo 
and Tan 2003).  
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Figure 2. 1Institutional effect on economic outcomes 
 
 
What are these Institutions? What Effect do Democratic Institutions have? 
 
Olson, like other contemporary institutional economists and comparative political 
scientists, has focused much on the relationship within ‘developed’ democracies. 
This research often excludes nascent democracies and analyses of their 
economic performance. However, I contend nascent democracies are the ideal 
subjects for further study of the relationships between institutions, policies, and 
growth.  In the subsections that follow I undertake a review of the current 
literature – in particular Lijphart (1999) and Powell (1982) - in order to ascertain 
the viability of applying the existing studies to the nascent democracies in East 
Asia. I conclude that the literature can be safely extended beyond it’s the 
confines of developed nations and I employ a new sample in a simple exploratory 
model.  
 
Executive-Legislative relations 
Party Systems 
Electoral Systems 
Bicameralism Government Economic Outcomes 
Political Institutions 
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In an attempt to explain further the effect of institutions on socio-economic 
performance I will use an additional theoretical concept, namely, “veto-players”: 
which are “individual(s) or collective actor(s) whose agreement is required for a 
policy decision” (Tsebelis 1995: 293). This author sought to accommodate 
variation between all institutions irrespective of observable difference, across 
party systems, legislatures and executives through this single independent 
variable. Tsebelis used this concept as a move away from the traditional pair 
wise comparisons, for instance presidential versus parliamentary, as well as 
increasing sample size, a method that is predominant within contemporary 
literature for instance Lijphart (1999). In this thesis I use the veto-player method 
to complement the pair wise comparison.  
 
It is the intention of this thesis to explain to what extent configurations of 
institutions will affect veto players and consequently, socio-economic 
performance. The following sections below explain further the implications of this 
my method and proposed model.  
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Democratic Institutions – Which Ones Matter8? 
 
Many theorists have attempted to examine and evaluate the macroeconomic 
implications of institutions within a given environment. Indeed, seminal work 
conducted by Haggard (1990) revealed that specific government configurations 
do in fact have had significant effects. In addition, Rodrik (2000) has examined 
the importance of specific institutions to sustained economic performance. Yet 
little work has been done looking at the implications of institutions other than civil-
political rights, property rights, legal systems, and other systemic indicators of 
executive constraint.  
 
Lijphart (1999) surveyed thirty-six developed democracies in an attempt to 
classify, contrast and examine their similarities and differences, particularly their 
political characteristics. Prominent within his typology are the distinctions 
between the forms of democratic government within the successful countries of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]. For the 
sake of brevity I have chosen four institutions for this thesis; first cabinets; the 
composition of which gives insight as to the degree of which the government 
retains executive power vis-à-vis its actual legislative standing. This institution is 
easily applied to all forms of government, has good explanatory power and 
provides a sound variable even with a limited number of cases.  Secondly, the 
                                                 
8
 In the attempt to understand the definition of democracy I follow the lead of Hsieh (2002) who in turn 
followed Schumpeter (1976) and Huntington (1991) whom use “a procedural definition of democracy as a 
system under which candidates for the most powerful position in the government are chosen by the general 
public in free and fair elections.”  
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type of electoral system in place within the political system is an important 
institution that influences both the party system and executive formation. 
Contemporary literature places great emphasis on the variation of this institution 
(See  Powell 1982; Crepaz 1996; Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Lijphart 1999); 
many therefore consider the relationship between it and economic performance 
pivotal to an understanding of a country’s political system. Thirdly, party systems, 
in particular the contrast between multiparty or two-party systems, have been 
traditionally taken to represent the distinction between few veto players and 
many veto players. Additionally, party systems like electoral systems are 
evaluated as a scale number and therefore provide larger number of variables for 
a small sample size. These three institutions best represent the variation 
discussed within the literature. The last institution, bicameralism, has very little 
existing theory dedicated to its relationship with economic performance; however 
there is great variation within the sample, hence it warrants examination.   
 
What Democratic Institutions do not Matter? 
 
A notable exclusion is the examination of  executive-legislative relations, 
invariably involving a discussion of presidential versus parliamentary style of 
government (Persson and Tabellini 2003). Primarily, this institution has been 
excluded as a wealth of existing literature pertaining to the regime dichotomy and 
in particular to the question which is best suited to developing countries already 
exists. The second point leads directly from the first; this institution refers to only 
 23 
two categories and therefore restricts the variation that can occur within a 
sample; something which is unhelpful when considering only a small number of 
cases.  
 
A second institution referred by Lijphart but not emphasised in this thesis is the 
division of power, specifically the contrast between federal and unitary. In short 
Malaysia represents the one true federal country in this sample.  Because in my 
sample the countries are almost exclusively unitary, this descriptor does not 
generate sufficient variation to warrant inclusion.   
 
Lijphart (1999) refers to two other institutions, interest groups and central bank 
independence. The latter, as I suggest in Chapter Three, tend to have very little 
variation (insofar as they all tend to be autonomous economic bureaucracies) 
and I therefore list them as a similarity and not a difference. Interest groups were 
used by Lijphart to contrast between pluralism and corporatism, but because of 
the lack of strong ideological ties between social groups and parties within Asian 
democracies, this variable also is of little descriptive value (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995; Blondel 1999).  
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The Four Institutions 
 
 
In the following section I will discuss the four institutions used in the analysis. 
 
 
Cabinets 
 
 
A cabinet may be loosely described as a group of high-ranking government 
officials, usually representing the executive branch, which set the government’s 
policy direction and control its legislative agenda.  Cabinet members are 
commonly drawn from the ranks of the dominant party in the legislature but this 
need not always be the case (for instance, in the United States the cabinet 
consists of government personnel who are not members of Congress).  Within all 
democratic systems there are differences in the make up of the cabinet; 
principally, whether it is made up of a coalition of parties or a single party9 
(hereinafter referred to as “cabinet composition”) (Lijphart 1999). Further, to what 
extent is there legislative support for this cabinet (Lijphart 1999).  
 
 
 
 
Lijphart (1999) categorises cabinet structure on the levels of legislative support10. 
                                                 
9
 Generally speaking there are other varied aspects within the term executive-legislative relations. Lijphart 
(1999) in addition to examining cabinet composition also looks specifically at the differences between 
presidential and parliamentary systems. Although much of the categorization occurring above can be 
subsumed into either of these two categories much has already be done within this field. Further, I believe 
that the dichotomy reduces the number of cases and variables for the statistical analyses.  
10
 Presumably the composition of cabinet refers to simply parliamentary systems. However, it can also be 
used to describe other systems of regime type, presidential and hybrid. In the former system in addition to 
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First, “minimal winning cabinets” are, in essence, the representatives of a party 
(or coalition of parties) which controls the bare minimum number of parliamentary 
seats needed to gain a majority in the legislature (Lijphart 1999: 90). 
Notwithstanding that other parties hold seats in parliament; a minimal winning 
cabinet is still able to control the legislature. Secondly, “minority or undersized 
cabinets” are essentially without the support of a parliamentary majority, but may 
require other parties’ votes of matters of confidence and to ensure the safe 
passage of government legislation (Lijphart 1999: 91)11. Lastly, Lijphart classifies 
“oversized cabinets” as those “which contain more parties than are necessary for 
majority support in the legislature” (Lijphart 1999: 90). 
 
Lijphart’s three classifications reveal a salient issue namely, the existence of veto 
players in cabinets and legislatures.  As I discuss above, I contend that veto 
players are essential for an understanding of the institutional framework in 
nascent democracies. The general principle is that as the number of parties in a 
cabinet increases, so too does the number of veto players, thus reducing any 
major party’s scope for ideal policy implementation12. Tsebelis (1995) suggests 
that these type of cabinets, such as minority and oversized, induce compromise 
                                                                                                                                                 
there being no provision for a vote of ‘no confidence’ being produced by the legislature against it and 
therefore not necessarily needing extended support by them, the executive can have a cabinet that is either 
minimal or oversized. Meaning if the chief executive includes members from another party it is considered 
oversized. Hybrid systems are institutions whereby there is a president-premier relationship with the latter 
generally responsible to the legislature. In this instance the institution is considered for general purposes 
parliamentary and therefore can be attributed one of three categories listed below.  
11
 Lijphart (1999) essentially view these as indicative of a coalition style of governance, due to the reliance 
of other parties for successful passage of legislation. 
12
 I use the phrase here to qualify the minority coalition category, whereby there may be only one party in 
the cabinet yet there is a need for other parties in the legislature to prop up its’ legislation timetable and 
supply ‘no confidence votes’. Hence, effectively, there are additional veto players for this category as 
opposed to the minimal winning cabinet category.  
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and consensus to achieve policy. Minimal winning cabinets generally only have 
one veto player (the legislative opposition) and thus do not need to moderate 
their internal decision making for the benefit of another party. 
 
Importantly, these categories are not restricted to purely parliamentary regimes. 
Other government systems, particularly those that have direct election of their 
executives, also exhibit several of the features listed above. Non-parliamentary 
systems may be assessed with some legitimacy according to Lijphart’s typology. 
Many such power systems are by definition “minimal winning cabinets”, however 
it can still be said that some such systems still need de facto support to push 
through legislation even though they do not face formal votes of ‘no confidence’. 
Non-parliamentary systems which have other veto players/parties within the 
“cabinet” I would categorise as “oversized cabinets” for instance the 1988 
Thirteenth National Assembly of South Korea.  
 
Cabinet type may have an effect on economic growth.  In terms of economic 
output, Crepaz (1996) suggests that there is a significant relationship between 
coalition cabinets and the reduction of unemployment and inflation. Similarly, 
Roubini and Sachs (1989b) tested similar arrangements to Lijphart’s three 
cabinet classifications with 15 OECD countries to demonstrate the effects on 
government budgetary policy. Their results concluded that coalition 
arrangements, in particular minority and oversized cabinets, are highly correlated 
with budget deficits. Hahm’s (1994) country analysis of Japan’s government 
 27 
formation suggested that minimal winning cabinet arrangements effectively 
determine the state of fiscal policy for a country on a long term basis.  He 
suggested that such cabinets encourage fiscal prudence and lower deficits. 
Similar institutional theory considers that increased number of veto players as 
directly proportional to rent-seeking behaviour a “trade-off” inherent within the 
more inclusive forms of cabinet arrangements such as minority and oversized 
cabinets (Bohrer 2001). Importantly for the social aspect of this thesis, a higher 
number of veto players within cabinet has been correlated with lower levels of 
income inequality (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998). 
 
Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) examined the broad impact of consensus political 
institutions on income inequality and concluded that they exhibit a strong 
correlation with higher levels of income redistribution policies in a given country13. 
In general terms, their discussion focuses on the incorporation of Tsebelis’ 
(1995) “veto players” concept into their own unique framework as a means of 
evaluating the extent to which multi-party cabinets, and other similar institutions, 
affected income inequality. They suggested a separation of this method into two 
divisions, collective and competitive; the former, “collective veto players…emerge 
from institutions where the different political actors operate in the same body and 
whose members interact with each other on a face to face basis” (Birchfield and 
Crepaz 1998: 182). This institution engenders “collective agency and shared 
responsibility” and as a consequence it becomes highly likely that compromise 
                                                 
13
 In addition they are also studied multi-party legislatures and proportional electoral systems.  
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and consensus are the means to a modified decision-making process based on 
several different interests (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998: 182) (See Also Schmidt 
1996). A noted example of collective veto players are in multi-party cabinets or 
multiparty legislatures; both of which are prominent institutions in this thesis. The 
second subdivision, competitive veto-players are present within institutions 
whereby each member has equal veto powers, this is more prominent within the 
bicameral institution detailed below. I have adopted Birchfield and Crepaz’s 
unique manifestation of Tsebelis’ veto players in order to provide rationales for 
the likelihood of specific varieties of consensus institutions affecting socio-
economic indicators, specifically, cabinet composition, party systems and 
electoral systems. 
 
In summary, more inclusive forms of cabinet arrangements are likely to be 
correlated with lower rates of inflation and unemployment. Further, it is 
suggested that the increased number of veto players within the executive can 
lower the levels of income inequality. Consequently, the general literature has 
hypothesised that the redistributive effects or rent seeking behaviour, of such 
forms of government are associated with lower levels of fiscal performance over 
a longer time frame.   
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Party System14 
 
Another phenomenon that is central to the political-economy literature is the 
structure of the party system. Various configurations of this institution are 
considered important factors in socio-economic outcomes (Weaver and 
Rockman 1993; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; MacIntyre 2001; Zhang 2003) 15. 
For this thesis I have chosen to look solely at the effective number of parties in 
the legislature16. This variable is closely related to other concepts such as 
cabinet composition, and veto players, which I also employ.  One complaint 
about assessing party systems is that they are fluid and always changing but 
Powell (1982), Lipset  and Rokkan  (1967) all agree that in fact parties “are not 
easily dislodged by changing conditions, or even new voting generations” (Powell 
1982: 75). Indeed, as it will be shown later, party systems are a strong influence 
on the political, social and economic outcomes of all Asian countries. 
 
Early writing on the effective number of parties gives an anachronistic view of the 
multiparty system. Lowell (1896) presumes that only the two-party pluralist 
system –in this instance, the British Parliament –is the only justifiable method of 
governing the state. It values the idea of a “defractionalised, two-party, centrist 
party system that will aggregate citizens’ resources behind governmental 
                                                 
14
 Inherent in the make-up of party systems are two factors, polarization and fragmentation. The latter 
refers to the effective number parties within the legislature. Polarisation however is the ideological distance 
between parties within the legislature. However in this instance in Asian economies ideological 
competition between parties is a non-existent issues, hence the emphasis only of party fragmentation 
(Blondel 1999; Zhang 2003). 
15
 This is pertinent to other institutions mentioned in the thesis.  
16
 I make reference to another aspect of party systems, party ideology, in Chapter Three. 
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majorities responsive to citizen pressures” (Powell 1982: 74). Termed 
“aggregative party systems”, it permits generally only one winner in each 
electoral cycle (Powell 1982: 76).  
 
Many established industrialised European democracies have long used 
multiparty legislatures (Powell 1982; Lijphart 1999). However, there are a number 
of issues relevant for nascent democracies, one of which is the increased 
difficulty in forming durable coalition governments (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). 
Similarly, excessive party fragmentation within such countries’ weakly 
institutionalised settings,  “characterized by unstable voter loyalties and large 
swings in party support from election to election”, can affect the coordination of 
sustained economic policy (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 167). 
 
Many authors suggest that multipartism adversely affects only parliamentary 
democracies. However presidential systems are equally affected by high 
numbers of parties within the legislature. Mainwaring (1993) suggests that 
executives can become  powerless in pursuit of their policy goals due to a large 
number of veto players outside cabinet. Further, the rigidity of elections in these 
systems motivates smaller parties to cooperate less with larger governing 
parties, prompting the increased possibility of “legislative blackmail” (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995: 170)17.   
   
                                                 
17
 Terra (2002: 280) surmises that “differences in economic performance among cases appears to be linked 
much to the number of parties as to whether a system is presidential or parliamentary.”  
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It can be seen that differences in economic performance between countries is 
perhaps less to do with whether the party system operates within a presidential 
or parliamentary regime, but rather is linked to the  effective number of parties 
(Terra 2002)18. Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) concluded that indeed there was a 
significant correlation between higher number of effective parties and lower 
levels of income inequality. Similarly a high number of parties also may affect 
rates of inflation and unemployment (Tsebelis 1995; Crepaz 1996).  Further, 
Terra (2002: 281) suggests that irrespective of government type, presidential or 
parliamentary, all instances of high growth and low inflation occurred under “two-
party or dominant-party systems” .   
 
In conclusion, the contrast between multi-party and two-party systems is fairly 
distinctive. Theorists who have favoured the higher number of collective veto-
players emphasise the virtuous benefits of the relationship between a large 
number of veto players in the executive and lower levels of income inequality, 
lower rates of inflation and unemployment. Conversely, all instances within the 
sample of high growth and low inflation have arisen in dominant-party systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Terra (2002) cites Haggard and Kaufman (1995). 
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The Cameral Structure of Democracies 
 
Bicameralism is simply the division of the legislature into two chambers, 
commonly an upper and lower house. It is not a structure limited to federal 
countries, although it is strongly associated with such countries, but there are 
examples within unitary parliamentary systems, notably Great Britain.  One of the 
concomitants of bicameralism is an increased number of veto players in the 
decision making process. However, these veto players differ in part to the 
collective veto players addressed above; strong bicameralism is associated with 
“competitive veto players”, whereby politicians operate “through separate 
institutions with mutual veto powers” (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998: 182). Birchfield 
and Crepaz (1998) go on to add that because of this strong tendency to 
immobilise policy making and generally restrain government, much decision 
making in bicameral legislatures follows a formalised process as opposed to the 
collective veto player’s tendency to compromise over the direction of policy.  
Tullock (1959) reaches a similar conclusion and suggests that the addition of an 
additional chamber mitigates the damaging force of majority rule, thereby 
protecting the interests of the minority (Hamilton, Jay et al. 1961).  Further, the 
presence of a second chamber can also reduce the potential power of the leader 
or “agenda setter” (See also Levmore 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997: 36). A 
common by-product of this arrangement is the lower likelihood of a policy change 
that differs too much from the status quo19.  
                                                 
19
 This is further explained in Chapter Three. 
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In terms of the effect of this institution on socio-economic factors, Hahm (1994) 
suggests bicameralism is important for the determination of ‘fiscal prudence’. 
Similarly Bradbury and Cain (2002) conclude that bicameralism is significantly 
correlated with fiscal policy; a weak or centralised legislature is likely to affect an 
increase of redistributive policies; this point is also found by Crepaz and 
Birchfield (1998) in their study on the impact of bicameralism with income 
inequality. Tsebelis and Chang (2004) conclude that this bicameral legislatures 
are largely successful in controlling the rate of inflation.  
 
Overall, the incidence of a strong second chamber is associated with long term 
fiscal prudence; indeed, there is a significant correlation between bicameralism 
and low levels of inflation. However, it suggested that weak bicameralism or 
unicameralism is associated with rent-seeking behaviour and therefore may be 
related to increase in redistributive policies and lower levels of income 
inequality20.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Both the terms ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ are drawn from Lijphart’s (1999) categorisation of cameral 
structures. Chapter Three explains in detail the scale used to classify various strengths, but in short the 
definitions used here refer to both the strength of the second chamber, and to its method of election 
specifically if it over represents minorities or not, for example the United States of America’s Senate. This 
latter country is considered ‘strong’ within the index, whereas the United Kingdom’s House of Lords 
would be deemed ‘weak’, due its second chamber having no substantial veto power or democratic 
legitimacy. 
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Electoral System 
 
The electoral system has critical implications for the design of the greater 
institutional system. Importantly it controls the number of veto players entering 
into the legislature, in addition to also indirectly affecting the composition of 
cabinet. Yet this institution still has direct consequences for socio-economic 
outcomes as discussed below. 
 
Duverger’s Law suggests than any given type of political system in a country may 
be derived from the design of the electoral system (Duverger 1964).  Two models 
predominate; firstly the plurality model and its dominant two-party system and 
secondly, the proportional representation system and its multiparty system.  
 
In regards to economic performance there is little consensus as to the effects of 
this institution. Lijphart (1999) argues that there are significant correlations 
between proportional forms of this representation and lower rates of inflation. 
Crepaz (1996) further postulates that electoral systems affect better quality of 
life, lower levels of income inequality, in addition to lower rates of unemployment 
and inflation. Persson and Tabellini (2004) emphasise the relationship between 
proportional electoral systems and rent-seeking behaviour as opposed to a 
pluralist model whereby the minority is less likely to be left out of government 
expenditure (Persson, Roland et al. 2003). 
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McIntyre (2001) reviewed the 1998 financial crisis and determined that within the 
four developmental countries of South-East Asia those that employed 
proportional forms of electoral system ran into immediate difficulties21. These 
difficulties were not principally derived from the economic crises but in part 
sprung from inflexibility due the large number of collective and competitive veto 
players. Bohrer similarly concludes that specific forms of these political 
institutions are more likely to suffer from ineffectiveness and more likely to 
endure crises (Bohrer 2001: 18) .  
 
In review, it is hard to definitely conclude to what extent proportional forms of 
electoral systems impact the performance of socio-economic variables. In one 
instance this type of institution is correlated with a higher quality of life and lower 
levels of income inequality; however, in direct contrast, some authors evaluate 
this variety of institution as ineffectual and more likely to stall economic 
development. From this last point it may be inferred that a plurality system is 
conducive to stability and unlikely to widely distort the market. 
 
How does the General Literature Explain Economic Performance in 
Emerging Asian countries? 
 
The past two decades has seen the rapid industrialisation and growth of Asian 
economies. In general the academic response has been to characterise this feat 
as the successful implementation of economic policies, initially by prior 
                                                 
21
 Incidentally these four countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand are also part of my 
sample populations. 
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benevolent authoritarian governments and subsequently by similar pro-business 
based institutions. Whilst this may hold true for some part of economic 
performance many of these countries have had marked periods of rapid 
democratisation. Further, in closer inspections it is clear that several countries 
have had markedly superior economic performance to others for instance Taiwan 
and South Korea. To what extent does the current literature explain such a 
variation? 
  
The general democratic institutional literature has predominantly examined 
established industrialised democracies. Comparatively there is very little work 
conducted in regards to nascent democratic institutions of emerging Asian 
countries’ economies. This thesis therefore contemplates to what extent 
democratic institutions explain economic performance in this region.     
 
Neo-institutional literature within an Asian setting has focused primarily on the 
role of the state as a propagator of economic development. Haggard’s (1990) 
work examined institutional variation across rapidly industrialising countries, 
concluding that the political structures in place are important to sustained 
economic development. Similarly, Heo and Tan (2003) expanded on this theme, 
examining the differences in economic outcomes, between two supposedly 
similar political regimes of Taiwan and South Korea, and their responses to the 
1997 Asian financial crisis (See also MacIntyre 2001). However, there is only a 
very small quantity of literature on the role of democratisation and its effects on 
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socioeconomic outcomes; specifically which aspects and type of government are 
conducive to sustained economic development.  
 
This thesis attempts to expand on the theme by the authors mentioned above; 
however, I posit that democratic institutional differences are able to explain some 
variation of socio-economic performance within Asian countries. Further, these 
countries make for an interesting case study for various reasons.  First, the rapid 
economic rise of these countries is traditionally attributed to the successful 
implementation of economic policies (See World Bank 1993). Until recently 
democracy has been commonly viewed as somehow intrinsically conflicting with 
Asian culture (See Koh 1993; Inoguchi 1995). Secondly, institutional change in 
this area is faster compared to other developing democracies and established 
democracies. Lastly, many of these countries have similar political histories, with 
common economic backgrounds, democratization periods and mutual economic 
policies (Booth 1999).  
 
I contend that the variation of socio-economic performances within this sample is 
in part due to differences in democratic institutions. Although a large portion of 
current institutional literature is concerned with developed industrialised 
democracies it also provides a platform for further examination. It may be the 
case that these hypotheses (developed in an industrialised context) do not have 
great explanatory power for emerging Asian countries. Yet there is a strong 
possibility that there may still be relevance given that many East Asian regimes 
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derived their institutions from Western developed democracies (for instance the 
Philippines and the United States of America). The occurrence of significant 
relationships confirming these hypotheses may shed light on the effect of 
institutions within this new research. Indeed, one would surmise that many of 
these Asian countries experience with democracy mirror that of Greece and 
Spain, both former authoritarian states with comparatively recent democratisation 
periods. 
 
Extending Current Institutional Literature to Account for Economic 
Performance with Asian Democracies 
 
It may be that institutional literature in its present form is ineffective in examining 
potential relations. Further, the situational differences between developing Asian 
democracies and developed industrialised democracies are large enough to 
warrant new exploration. To accommodate the current literature’s hypotheses I 
will add some other economic indicators to establish whether new relationships 
can be explored. Specifically, foreign direct investment (FDI) is an issue of 
contention for many of the sample countries. The relatively economically 
successful countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, have used very 
little foreign capital to spur investment and FDI is therefore seen by other new 
democracies as a means for sustainable economic development (Booth 1999). 
However there is noticeable difference in levels of FDI between the samples; I 
contend that some of the variation may in part be due to the arrangement of the 
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democratic institutions present in a country. Other indicators, including GDP per 
capita and Openness Index, are two commonly used indicators I have also 
included in this thesis22.  
 
The addition of new indicators however has potential impact for the political 
institutions outside the hypothesised outcomes mentioned in the current 
literature. Further none of the projections listed above takes into account the 
effect of democracy on GDP per capita, FDI or Openness. Indeed, I contend that 
the effect of institutions can explain further than simply the rates of inflation and 
unemployment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 This index is used to indicate to what extent countries place restrictions on the influx of imports into 
their national markets. Essentially, a lower index score reflects a protectionist policy for instance Japan’s 
(1990-92) score has been 14.53 ,compared with Malaysia’s (1990-94) 174.13; Chapter Three explains 
further how the index is calculated (Penn World Table 2004b).  
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Chapter Three – Data and Method 
 
This thesis is an exploratory examination of nascent democratic institutions within 
a small sample of East and South-East Asian countries. It seeks to explore 
empirical patterns and causal inferences between institutions and socio-
economic performance.  
 
Chapter Two reviewed the literature about institutions, their recorded effects on 
socio-economic indicators and provided a series of hypotheses. These 
hypotheses reflect the general relationships and patterns established between 
the four selected democratic institutions: cabinet composition, party systems, 
bicameralism and electoral systems. The central question is whether the 
established relationships hold for nascent democracies as they do for established 
democracies; further, as I discussed prior, do these new indicators help shed 
light on other potential effects of these institutions23? 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections; firstly Data, an introduction to the 
countries examined and how the hypotheses are operationalised. Secondly, a 
review of the Method, specifically the comparative method used for this thesis - 
its strengths and weaknesses  
 
                                                 
23
 Hypothesis-testing is the purview of Chapter Four Analysis; this chapter is concerned with the data and 
method for this research.  
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Why these Countries? 
 
Recent examinations of the effects of nascent democratic institutions have 
largely focussed on post-communist societies (See Przeworski 1991). 
Comparatively little research has been conducted on the democratic institutions 
present within East and South-East Asia. Indeed, as was mentioned in Chapter 
two the case for examining these countries is interesting due to very similar 
political and economic histories (Booth 1999). Hence, a comparison of the 
original institutions with current structures may produce significant variation and 
enable the extraction of certain predictions. I suggest that such an analysis can 
illustrate the widely disparate socio-economic outcomes within the sample, 
therefore making for an interesting evaluation of the respective democratic 
institutions and the effects of these institutions.  
 
Due to the small number of new democracies within East and South-East Asia it 
is important to find a comparative method that accommodates the lack of cases 
but retains validity24. The most-similar-system (MSS) design provides a suitable 
framework to examine the effect of institutions vis-à-vis social and economic 
variables25. The framework uses comparisons between very similar countries to 
allow examination of their differences. Variation amongst the sample, specifically 
                                                 
24
 A common downside to analyses using a small number of cases compared to the number of variables is 
the lack of systematic control throughout. Discussion about this problem is described at the end of this 
chapter.  
25
 A detailed description of this system is discussed later within the chapter 
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areas of interest, allow for the exploration of hypotheses about the relationships 
between the independent variables and their dependent variables.  
 
The seven countries have been, and to an extent still are, examples of tiger 
economies26. Similar in economic perspectives, each country remains export-
orientated whilst many have had benevolent authoritarian governments. The 
combination of these two characteristics has created a path of similar economic 
and political development. Booth (1999) states that all the major South-East 
countries have followed the developmental path of Taiwan and South Korea27. 
Therefore as a basis of comparison, three factors are considered pertinent to the 
relative economic development of this sample; high levels of domestic 
investment, export-oriented policy regimes and an autonomous economic 
bureaucracy.   
 
Firstly, all the countries in the sample exhibit high levels of domestic investment 
and low levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). Gross Domestic Capital 
Formation within our sample reveals that all countries use high levels of 
investment to encourage high levels of economic growth28. The low levels of FDI 
are conspicuous compared to other developing countries; Booth concludes that 
FDI, although important, plays a lesser role in these countries compared to 
                                                 
26
 A tiger economy is one where the country aggressive pursues economic growth, consequently raising the 
standard of living for their citizens. Six of the seven countries are examples of this phenomenon, Japan the 
obvious exception. 
27
 Although development occurred earlier in Japan, their developmental path is very similar to South Korea 
and Taiwan. 
28
 Booth (1999) suggests that the Philippines is to a lesser extent suffered from lower growth due to its 
lower levels of investment within the economy. 
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domestic savings (Booth 1999).  The northern developed economies, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, all use domestic savings as means of channelling 
capital to private investors. 
 
Secondly, the export-orientated policies of this sample serve as a basis for 
comparison (Booth 1999: 309). Within the sample countries, all parties, 
regardless of political ideology, favour export-oriented economic policies29. As 
Booth emphasises; “it is essential in order to achieve the virtuous circle of rapid 
export growth leading to increased investment which in turn promotes further 
growth” (Booth 1999: 309).  
 
Lastly, a strong theme that runs through each of the countries in the sample is 
the presence of an “insulated economic bureaucracy” (Booth 1999: 309).  Free 
from government oversight, central banks and economic technocrats within the 
various ministries of finance are allowed to pursue coherent macro-economic 
policies that spur their accelerated economic growth.  Lijphart (1999) similarly 
concludes, suggesting that these institutions are strongly correlated with 
significant economic performances, notably inflation.  
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. These countries are by 
and large on the same developmental track, the current literature highlights the 
success of economic policies, but overall little is presumed about the effects of 
                                                 
29
 This is probably due to party ideology not playing a part in Asian politics, consequently most parties that 
are elected in to executive office often follow closely similar economic policies of their predecessor 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Blondel 1999). 
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democratic institutional change. The question remains to what extent are nascent 
democratic institutions able to influence social and economic performance? 
 
Operationalisation 
 
Hypothesis testing within a quantitative environment requires both sets of 
variables, independent and dependent, to be readily inputted as factors of an 
equation. However, in the case of social science many variables are not easily 
reduced to numerical scales due their multi-dimensionality, for instance 
democracy. Such qualities are therefore difficult to incorporate into a single 
dimension equation. In order to retain a simple single dimensional analysis it is 
common for only one element of democracy, such as civil and political rights, to 
be crudely quantified and then tested in the equation30.  Such an approach is, by 
necessity, a crude approximation of “degrees” of democratisation yet enables 
simple statistical analyses. Consequently the variables require indicators that not 
only represent some quality of the original form but are also able to undergo 
statistical analysis (namely, numerical indicators)31. For the sake of simplicity and 
                                                 
30
 See fn. 31 for discussion on “indirect relationships”. 
31
 Comparative (statistical) method research more often than not requires ancillary qualitative judgment to 
ascertain processes of “concept formation and measurement” (Jackman 1971: 176). Thus, by that definition 
alone research relies heavily on correct theoretical criteria. In terms of what is discussed above, 
measurement is often described as either direct or indirect (Przeworski and Teune 1970: chap. 5). Firstly, in 
terms of the direct case, “the measure defines the concept: if we define the level of economic development 
as gross national product, we are engaging in direct measurement.” (Jackman 1971 176) Secondly, indirect 
measurement generally involves an “independently defined concept and one or a series of indicators that 
are taken to reflect that concept.” (Jackman 1971: 176) For instance, this thesis is looking at the institution 
executive-legislative relations; however, the independent concept is cabinet composition from which we 
use a nominal indicator used by Lijphart (see below). Consequently, this form of measurement owes its 
own validity “to the extent that it accurately reflects the concept, which means that validity is a matter of 
degree and involves judgment” (Jackman 1971: 176). 
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reliability all the independent variables for this analysis have indicators taken 
from Lijphart’s (1999) work: cabinet composition represents executive-legislative 
relations, the effective number of parties within the legislature accounts for the 
party system, a cameral index reflects the strength of bicameralism for each 
legislature, and the Rae Index  (1967) denotes the disproportionate nature of the 
electoral systems. The dependent variables/concepts that will be used and their 
indicators are derived from socio-economic literature and well-known scholarly 
sources: GDP per capita, growth, openness, unemployment, inflation, FDI, 
Human Development Index (HDI) and income inequality32. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The rationales for three of the four variables – cabinet composition, party 
systems, and electoral systems – are very similar; the last institution, 
bicameralism, has a rationale that differs only in the organisation of veto players.   
 
The design of an electoral system effectively determines the number of veto 
players in a parliament. In terms of political accountability, politicians “may have 
stronger direct incentive to please the voters if they are held accountable 
individually, rather than collectively” (Persson and Tabellini 2004: 81). Those 
elected via list-voting or proportional representation are less likely to attach 
responsibility of their actions to their electorates. In comparison politicians 
                                                 
32
 In some instances the socio-economic indicators are simplified versions of the original or in some 
instances they are chosen due to their ease of manipulation and large sample size i.e. Penn World Tables. 
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directly elected through a constituency or a plurality/majoritarian election are 
somewhat more inclined to “put the electorate first” (Persson and Tabellini 2004). 
The indirect by-product of this accountability system is a higher predicted political 
rent-seeking in electoral systems that rely on list voting systems, due to the 
potential for large multi-party legislatures and coalition governments.  
 
“Under single-party government, voters know precisely whom to blame or reward for observed 
performance. Under coalition government, voters may not know whom to blame, and the votes lost for bad 
performance are shared amongst all coalition partners; this dilutes the incentives of individual parties to 
please the voters.”  (Persson and Tabellini 2004: 84) (See also Persson, Roland et al. 
2003) 
 
Party systems potentially affect socio-economic outcomes in two ways; firstly, 
when there are small numbers of veto players (such as in two-party or dominant 
party systems) they may form ‘catch-all’ organisations that generally ignore 
minority interests and provide non-specific economic policies that are considered 
fiscally prudent. Secondly, and conversely, where there are a large number of 
veto players within parliament, coupled with a lack of ideological links, this will 
likely result in smaller parties with links to special interest groups33. A significant 
by-product of this system is the creation of pork-barrel politics and a concomitant 
reduction in economic productivity.  
 
The number, and relative influence, of veto players may also affect cabinet 
composition. In this instance fewer veto players may permit majoritarian 
government which requires less compromise and therefore generates better 
                                                 
33
 Asian countries are not distinguished by ideological persuasion; see the comment below in the party 
systems classification. 
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fiscal policies. Minority and oversized cabinets, on the other hand, tend to include 
additional veto players from the legislature and are likely to appease a greater 
constituent.  This may result in diluted or inconsistent economic policy.  
 
Bicameralism differs slightly from the other institutions in that its veto players, 
specifically the second chamber, are inherently competitive34. Birchfield and 
Crepaz (1998) make the subtle distinction between the two sets of veto players 
as integral to understanding policy formation. Collective veto players are likely to 
occur within the electoral, party and cabinet institutions, due to the need to 
compromise and create policy. Conversely, competitive veto players, in particular 
the members of the second chamber, are generally less inclined to compromise, 
and this is exacerbated if mutual veto powers are also extended to them. A 
consequence of this type of institution is inflexibility of policy change and 
maintenance of the status quo.   
 
It is important to explain here how the second chamber maintains status quo and 
thereby prevents policy change; Tsebelis and Money (1997) suggest that each 
chamber has its “new ideal policy” and therefore both chambers’ policy 
preferences must be accommodated in order to find a common ground (1997: 
73).  Figure 3.1 depicts the current policy as SQ and that within each chamber 
there is a new ideal policy point (IPP), in this instance X, that represents “a point 
in space at which it would prefer to locate the legislative outcome” (1997: 73).  
 
                                                 
34
 Whilst I suggest that it is likely for second chambers to have competitive veto-players, there still has to 
be interaction with the lower chamber which for most part generally has collective veto-players.  
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 Figure 3. 1 A single chamber and its ideal policy point 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 74) 
Tsebelis and Money (1997: 74) further add that in this example that if the 
chamber cannot attain its ideal policy, then any outcome that is close to ‘X’ is 
preferred: “more precisely, each chamber is indifferent among points that are 
equally distant from its own ideal point”.  
 
To understand how IPPs are of relevance in a bicameral system, we can assume 
that each chamber has a different ideal policy point.  In the diagram below, ‘U’ 
represents the upper house’s IPP and ‘L’ for the lower house:  
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 Figure 3. 2 The intersection of the two chambers and their ideal policy points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 74) 
Further, within “a unicameral legislature (assume the lower chamber, L), the 
winset of the status quo, that is, the set of points that defeat the status quo, 
would be the entire area of a circle with centre L and radius LSQ” (Tsebelis and 
Money 1997: 74). Figure 3.1 depicts a scenario in which, irrespective of the ideal 
policy, the whole area inside the circle represents a series of available outcomes 
which are also changes to current policy.  
 
The addition of a second chamber (Figure 3.2) reduces significantly the winset of 
the status quo “to the intersection of the two circles, one with centre L and the 
other centre U” (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 74). Legislative outcomes of both 
chambers are therefore fewer than can be attained if there was one; this is 
because the there are only a limited number of ideal policy points that both U and 
L readily agree on – in this instance represented by the intersection. This point is 
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also emphasised by Riker (1992a; 1992b) who suggests that is more difficult to 
attain two majorities in separate chambers over one policy than it is for a single 
chamber. Hence the farther away the ideal policy points are from each other the 
smaller the intersection (Tsebelis and Money 1997). This is in part due to fact 
that if there are two very similar ideal policy points, there is are also a greater 
number of points in each circle that overlap; in contrast, two very dissimilar ideal 
policy points results in very few potential mutually acceptable outcomes.  
 
The reasons for disagreement over ideal policy points are potentially due to 
differences in the composition of the chambers. I contend that the varying 
strengths of the second chamber (expressed as per Lijphart’s index) change the 
nature of the legislative outcomes35. 
 
Cabinets 
 
The independent variable for this institution is cabinet composition. It examines 
the extent to which the cabinet reflects the legislature. Lijphart (1999) categorises 
cabinet structure into three levels of legislative support. Firstly, “minimal winning 
cabinets” are in essence the bare minimum of parliamentary seats, either 
controlled by a party or a coalition of parties, needed to gain a majority in the 
legislature (Lijphart 1999: 90).  Therefore extra seats are unnecessary in order to 
have simple control over legislation. Secondly, “minority or undersized cabinets” 
                                                 
35
 Lijphart’s (1999) index is explained on page 44. 
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are without the support of a parliamentary majority and often require other parties 
to avoid votes of ‘no confidence’ and therefore the safe passage of government 
legislation (Lijphart 1999: 91). Lastly, Lijphart classifies “oversized cabinets” as 
simply that “which contain more parties than are necessary for majority support in 
the legislature” (Lijphart 1999: 90).  
 
Due to the statistical nature of this thesis I will assign these three cabinet 
categories with nominal values; hence minimal winning cabinets are a one, 
minority cabinets are a two and lastly oversized cabinets are given a three36.   
 
Party System 
 
The assessment of party systems often involves the examination two factors - 
party fragmentation and polarisation. The first refers to the ‘effective number of 
parties’, whereas the second is “defined as the ideological distance among 
parties” (Powell 1982; See also Giacomo and Sartori 1983; Zhang 2003:73). In 
this thesis, party systems refer to fragmentation given that differences in 
ideological persuasion are minimal within East Asia (Haggard and Kaufman 
1995; Blondel 1999). Many opposition parties do not advocate policies which 
differ from those of other major parties. Such is the position of these 
“nonpolarised party systems” that parties are often referred to as “pragmatic”, 
meaning that the relationship between party and popular support stems from a 
                                                 
36
 Although some of my countries are strictly presidential, Philippines and Indonesia, or semi-presidential 
South Korea and Taiwan, I will refer to all executive offices as “cabinets”.  
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shared interest for good governance and not “strong ideological commitments” 
(See also Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Haggard 1997: 135).  
 
Well-known work undertaken by Sartori (1976) addresses the prospect of 
categorizing multiparty systems. Indeed, he saw the need to reference parties 
according to their actual presence within the system, not wanting to accredit 
smaller parties that may not affect potential government formation. Effectively, 
this method discounted parties that did not win seats and those that did not have 
coalition viability or the potential to become ‘kingmaker’. Similarly, Blondel 
(1968), created a classification system based on size of the parties and number 
within the system. Simple in design, it accounts for the major and minor parties 
within a political regime, classifying the latter as “half a party”. Although 
highlighting the effective number of parties it remains imprecise and unusable for 
any greater classification scheme. Both models rely on subjective assessment of 
what constitutes as a party within a given system.  For this reason I have relied 
on more sophisticated methods of categorising party systems. 
 
Lijphart adopted an index developed by Laasko and Taagepera (1979) to 
calculate the effective number of parties which is summarised in the following 
equation37.    
 
                                                 
37
 An alternative to this method is an index that is constructed using votes instead of seat percentages. 
Lijphart (1991) suggests that seat percentages follows on the argument that it is pertinent to the study of the 
effects of parties operating within parliament and particularly to cabinet formation.  
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The number of parties (N) is the proportion of seats ( is ) “of the i-th party”(Lijphart 
1999).  For this variable it is the percentage of seats won by each major party, 
ignoring those won by independents and those grouped together as “others”. For 
example in the Japanese 1990 election, the major parties scored 56%, 27.2%, 
9.0%, 3.1%, 2.7% and 0.8% respectively; with 0.2% and 0.4% allocated to 
Others and Independents respectively. The index is then calculated by 
converting the percentages to fractions for instance 56% became 0.56; 
subsequently a square root is assigned for every value and each number is 
added together, in this instance 0.397458. The last step of the calculation is to 
divide one by this number to create the effective number of parties for this 
electoral cycle, 2.5 (rounded to 1 decimal point).  
  
Bicameralism 
 
Lijphart’s (1999) categorisation of cameral structures is a classification system 
that can be formulated as an index number detailing each country to a variety of 
cameral structures. Lijphart’s theory has two core aspects:  
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1. The first major difference between the two chambers is the balance of 
constitutional powers. In most instances the second (upper) chamber 
defers in some way to the first (commonly an upper chamber retains a 
power of veto but may not initiate legislation), whereas in rare instances 
they are of equal weight. 
 
The aforementioned points can be assigned a dichotomous definition either as 
asymmetrical, where the chamber has unequal power, or symmetrical, whereby 
the second chamber has equal power. 
 
2. The second aspect is the manner of the election of the second chamber: it 
may follow different electoral rules than for the lower house. In many 
instances this is intended to “over-represent certain minorities” and 
Lijphart refers to this as “incongruence” (1999: 207). A prime example of 
this phenomenon is the election of senators in the United States of 
America with two candidates being elected from each state irrespective of 
the population size. 
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Lijphart uses these two cores aspects to construct a simple index that 
categorises the strength of bicameralism:  
 
• 4.0 - strong bicameralism  
• 3.0 - medium-strong bicameralism 
• 2.0 - weak bicameralism 
• 1.0 - unicameral;  
 
There are four things to note about this index. First, strong bicameralism is 
“characterised by both symmetry and incongruence” (Lijphart: 1999: 211). 
Second, medium-strong bicameralism is able to be divided into two subclasses, 
both given the same ranking and each determined by the absence of either 
symmetry or incongruence. Third, there was no strong bicameralism noted with 
our sample and hence the index effectively stops at 3.0. Lastly, although weak 
bicameralism is classified as being both asymmetrical and incongruent, and as 
such the majority of power lies with the first chamber, many theorists still deem 
this as precluding it from assuming de facto status as a unicameral political 
system (See Heller 1997; See Tsebelis and Money 1997). Heller (Heller 1997) 
concludes that the presence of a weak second chamber enables further input 
into policy decision-making even though the second chamber may be controlled 
by the same party. 
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Electoral System 
 
For this analysis I used a formula to measure the extent to which each electoral 
system was “disproportionate”38. The Rae (1967) index averages out the 
percentage difference of the votes to seats between the government party and 
the largest opposition party39. 
 
2
i iv s−
 
Here, i iv s− represents the difference between the percentages of votes garnered 
in the election and the actual number of seats awarded to the i th party. 
Subsequently, the two party differences are added together and divided by two to 
calculate the disproportionate score. Essentially, the lower the score the closer 
the system is to full proportionality, and therefore is considered fairer insofar as 
each vote cast has equal value. Higher scores signify plurality, by which an 
electoral system that rewards voters for winning candidates but ignores the 
losers’ votes, thereby reducing the democratic legitimacy of the whole system.  
For example in the South Korean 2000 elections, the two major parties (GNP and 
                                                 
38
 Disproportionate refers to the percentage difference between seats held by a party and the total number 
of votes accumulated in the election. For instance in the plurality/majoritarian system it is possible to win a 
constituency with 11% of the popular vote particularly if the rest is distributed between nine or more other 
candidates. Hence, in these types of elections there is a propensity for the governing party to have a 
majority in the legislature but not have it reflected in their popular vote.  
39
 Other methods of acquiring the disproportionality of a system are either by the additive system, whereby 
the differences between the major parties are added together e.g. the Loosemore-Hanby Index (1971). The 
downside to this method is the inability to “distinguish between a few large and serious deviations and a lot 
of small and relatively insignificant deviations” (Lijphart 1999: 158). Conversely, the other alternative is 
the Gallagher (1991) index used in Lijphart’s (1991) work to account for disproportionality, this system 
effectively builds on the Rae index two-fold, firstly, each vote-seat share is squared; secondly, once the 
result is divided by two it undergoes the square root function. I did not use it here to due to its unnecessary 
complication (Loosemore and Hanby 1971).  
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MDP) gained 39% and 35.9% of the votes respectively, compared to their 
acquisition of 48.7% and 42.1% of the seats respectively (Croissant 2001: 454 - 
456). Hence the differences for the respective parties, 9.7% (GNP) and 6.2% 
(MDP) added together is 15.9, and then divided in half results in an index score 
of 7.95. Comparatively other electoral cycles for the rest of sample ranges from 
Indonesia’s low [2004] 1.5 to Malaysia’s high [2004] 19.05 (Carr 2007)  
 
Dependent Variables 
  
These indicators represent the value of the current business cycle. Specifically 
these statistics or dependent variables for instance, inflation or unemployment 
suggests “how well the economy is doing and how well the economy is going to 
do in the future” (Moffat 2007).  
 
GDP per capita (Real) is calculated by “first applying the component growth rates 
between each pair of consecutive years, t-1 and t”, in this thesis I am examining 
the years (t) 1986 to 2000, “to the current price component shares in t-1 to obtain 
the domestic absorption (DA) growth rate for each year. This DA growth rate for 
each year is then applied backwards and forwards from [2000] and summed to 
the constant price net foreign balance to obtain the Chain GDP series” (Penn 
World Table 2004a: 11)40. 
 
                                                 
40
 Domestic Absorption defined: “A nation’s total use of its own output of goods and services in 
consumption and investment” (Rutherford 2002: 150). 
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Openness, is defined as the total number of imports and exports over real GDP 
per capita expressed as a percentage of GDP (Penn World Table 2004a). It is a 
general test of the extent of controls and policies that a specific country has over 
imports and their exports respectively. A higher number is indicative of lower 
tariffs and an export-led economy. 
 
Unemployment relates to the rate of unemployed each year expressed as 
percentage points. This indicator for all the countries except Japan in this thesis 
is derived principally from the Asian Development Bank Key Indicators Reports 
(2003a; 2006). Japan’s unemployment rate was exported from the World Bank 
Development Indicators Online database (2006). 
 
Inflation in this instance refers to consumer prices. Due to availability of data 
Taiwan is included in this measure. Consumer prices are measured as an annual 
rate of change, with the year 2000 as base year (2000=100). Data is taken from 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database (2006) from 
between the years 1986 and 2005. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment is the term given to the “net-inflows of investment” 
from foreign nationals into a given country (World Bank 2006)41. This wide 
definition therefore includes the “sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
                                                 
41
 The World Bank further defines this investment as “acquiring a lasting management interest” in a given 
enterprise, this may be “10 percent or more of voting stock” (World Bank 2006). 
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payments” (World Bank 2006). The data used for this thesis is the sum of the net 
inflows divided by GDP, and is from the years 1986-2005.  
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index measuring human 
development. It is made up of three factors:  
 
“a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the 
adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary 
schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
in purchasing parity (PPP) US dollars” 
         (UNDP 2006) 
 
Income Inequality in this thesis has two measures, the first being a simple and 
crude indicator using only the top decile score as measurement of the inequity of 
income dispersion42. This method is employed because insufficient data is 
available for a more extensive analysis. Hence the indicators are in actuality the 
percentage of Gross National Product controlled by the richest ten percent of 
each country (WIDER 2007)43. The second measure uses Gini coefficient scores 
which:  
“measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption 
expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received, against the 
cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index 
measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, 
expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents 
perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.     
     
(World Bank Development Indicators Online 2006)  
 
                                                 
42
 Unfortunately, due to a lack of consistent data for all countries across the sample I used two measures. 
43
 Data for this research came from the World Income Inequality Database (WIDER 2007): scores for 
Japan come from Shirahase (2001); Taiwan has its’ scores derived from the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS 2005); Cheong (2005) provided the scores for South Korea; and the four other countries, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand come from unpublished work of Deninger and Squire (2004). 
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This thesis uses Gini coefficient scores from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Factbook (1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2007). 
 
Method 
 
This thesis employs a cross-national statistical research method to explore 
evidential relationships between democratic institutions and socio-economic 
indicators.  
 
Comparative Method Defined  
 
The intention of this research is to find patterns within the quantitative data which 
justify causal inferences. Jackman (1985) considers this point further: “our goal is 
not to generate “comprehensive” descriptions, but rather to develop probabilistic 
generalisations about the causal relationships (or lack thereof) between 
variables” (1985: 166) (See Also Lijphart 1971).  However, central to the 
understanding of the comparative method is the acknowledgement of its 
limitations.  A misconception about social science is that causation can be 
“empirically demonstrated” but that can never be accomplished (Jackman 1985: 
172). As mentioned above, this research aims to establish causal inferences 
within the empirical patterns. Unfortunately, even though statistically there can be 
strong evidential results, the comparative method also requires theoretical 
underpinnings to interpret the data. 
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Quantitative Analysis Method 
 
This analysis attempts to gauge the relationship between four democratic 
institutions from across seven countries and seven socio-economic performance 
indicators. The analysis requires a method that accommodates a limited number 
of variable and cases but provides suitable data44. Cross-national statistical 
analyses that have fewer variables normally use ordinary least squares [OLS], 
also known as simple linear regression, to calculate correlation between 
variables. OLS is derived from the process of finding a trend line between two 
variables and their respective data or in other words a ‘line of best fit’. It is 
constructed by attempting to minimise the sum of the squares of the difference 
between the fitted function and the data (StatSoft 2003).  
 
This thesis examines the data as discrete electoral cycles. All dependent 
variables were grouped and averaged out for the electoral cycle for a given 
country. For instance, South Korea’s 1992-95 cycle, had respective inflation 
scores of 6.2%, 4.8%, 6.3%, 4.5% and therefore the average rate for the period 
was 5.45%. The HDI however had only one score for every five year period and 
therefore several cycles of some countries were omitted45. Independent variables 
are calculated somewhat differently. Three of the institutions were liable to 
change each election due to new voter preferences. For instance a new type of 
                                                 
44
 Although this exploratory thesis is not intended to be definitive, where there is a significant correlation 
within the regression, it stands that this would remain so in a larger dataset.  
45
 In the case of Taiwan, I purposely did not calculate their HDI scores. Unfortunately their status is not 
recognized by the United Nations; hence, scores for this country were omitted from their tables. 
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coalition is elected into the executive that differed from the previous elections; 
Thailand’s TRT Party formed a minimal-winning cabinet in the 2005 elections, a 
stark contrast to the oversized cabinets of the previous two decades of Thai 
politics (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005). The exception to this rule is the 
cameral index; Indonesia moved from a unicameral system [1.0] to a medium-
strong bicameral system [3.0] in the 2004 electoral cycle. Progression in this 
instance involves constitutional change and is largely definitive. Several of the 
institutions however are liable to change midway through a cycle such as cabinet 
composition. For the sake of simplicity I have recognised the new change only 
when it persists for the majority of the electoral cycle. Japan’s 1993-95 electoral 
cycle initially saw an oversized coalition assume power only to disintegrate 
several months later and a minimal winning cabinet take power for the remainder 
of the term. This period is categorized as a minimal winning cabinet because of 
the majority of the cycle was spent under that formation.  
 
What is Simple Regression? What is OLS? 
 
Simple regression is a technique used to “learn more about the relationship 
between several independent predictor variables and a dependent or criterion 
variable” (StatSoft 2003). Importantly a line of best fit, while primarily describing a 
relationship, also provides predictive value as to future trends. In other words a 
straight line is drawn to accommodate all the data points (Dallal 2007): 
^
0 1y b b x= +   
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Where 
^
y  refers to predicted data variable, 0b  is the y-intercept at Zero and 1b x  is 
the gradient of the slope adjusting for the independent data variable ( x ) (Dallal 
2007). 
 
 Residuals that are placed closed to the line represent a strong relationship, 
conversely, residuals further away from the regression denotes a weak 
regression (Dallal 2007). Residuals refer to the distance between the observed 
data and the predicted data. The latter is derived from the line of best fit; in terms 
of an equation it is represented by ( ^iy y− ) where, iy  is the observed data value 
and 
^
y is the predicted data value from the trend line (Dallal 2007). 
  
OLS is simply a linear regression for a sample population. This is particularly 
useful when the original population is large because it allows “analysts [to] 
generalise from the sample in hand to the population from which the sample was 
drawn” (Dallal 2007). Hence the equation has some resemblance to the sample 
equation: 
0 1i iY Xβ β ε= + +  
 
Here, 0β and 1β  are the “population regression coefficients and iε  is a random 
error peculiar to the i-th observation” (Dallal 2007). It must be remembered that 
when one draws relationships from these sample populations there is a degree of 
uncertainty when applying to the greater population (Dallal 2007). 
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Chapter Four: The Democratic Institutional Effect on East and 
South-East Asian Countries 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter mapped the hypothesis-testing framework for the research 
and illustrated the comparative method. This chapter examines to what extent 
political institutions – cabinet composition, party systems, bicameralism and 
electoral systems – affect the performance of the societies and economies of 
East and South-East Asia.  The data will highlight some expected relationships 
between effects of political institutions on socio-economic outcomes and some of 
the unexpected results. The significance of these new relationships is explored 
principally by asking what effects these democratic institutions have on socio-
economic performance indicators and what this means for the sample and 
literature in general. Further, my intention is to combine substantive research and 
theoretical criteria in the context of particular countries: although context cannot 
be operationalised into an equation, it contributes to the further understanding of 
the research.  
 
Due to this thesis’ exploratory nature, however, these findings are not in any way 
meant to be definitive. Indeed, this research is essentially without a constant 
variable to control for external economic and political influences, and thus 
statistical perfection (as in all social sciences) is impossible to obtain. It is also 
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important to remember that significant correlations are not necessarily indicative 
of a direct or indirect relationship; but must be viewed with a theoretical 
underpinning. 
 
The rest of this chapter examines each of the socio-economic indicators; the 
sections will explore whether the hypotheses from Chapter Two hold true for 
these developing democracies and to what extent new relationships are revealed 
and are able to be explained. 
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Inflation 
 
The results for the regression between institutions and inflation, Table 4.1, are 
presented here. 
 
Table 4.1 Institutions and Annual Change in Inflation 1986-2005 (%)  
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition -2.386** 0.999 
Cameral Index -1.608 1.111 
Effective no. of Parties 1.634** 0.799 
Disproportionality Index 0.158 0.262 
r²= 0.224 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=40 
  
Source: International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database (2006) 
 
What is apparent from the above analysis is a significant negative effect of the 
coalition independent variable on the annual change in inflation. For every 
increase of the nominal scale prescribed for cabinet composition (in this instance 
a minority cabinet and oversized coalitions) there is a sizeable inflation 
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decrease46. The interpretation of results, specifically the implications of 
“consensus democracy” and its effects on lowering rates of inflation emphasises 
the point made by authors such as Lijphart (1984, 1991, 1994, 99), Crepaz 
(1996), and Crepaz and Birchfield (1998). The presumption is that as the number 
of actors within an executive increases so too does the number of veto players, 
prompting the prospect of compromise as opposed to polarisation between major 
actors over decision. This reinforces the comment made in chapters two and 
three regarding the role of collective veto players and policies that accommodate 
wider general interests rather than simply those of the majority winner. The 
corollary of this, Crepaz’s (1996) claim that coalition cabinets provide continuous 
government and thus negate the effect of a change in office, something 
associated with Westminster-style government executives. I contend such 
changes in government in a non-coalition system are potentially inflationary. This 
is due to the fact that in two-party systems the “scale of (executive) change” is 
large when each party takes its turn in offices; comparatively, multiparty coalition 
cabinets generally have small changes in the minority partners and each 
electoral cycle, and therefore as a whole, policy change is less drastic (Crepaz 
1996: 95). Crepaz further adds that the need for continuity is out of “necessity 
rather than virtue” due to small duration of tenure  for coalition executives 
(Crepaz 1996: 96)47. Veto-player theory puts it more simply: coalition 
                                                 
46
 Although a minority is in the strict sense of the word really a one party executive, within the 
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems legislative support requires other parties outside cabinet. 
Lijphart (1999) considers this de facto coalition relationship an example of consensus style politics. 
47
 Crepaz (1996) examines coalition governments as forms of Olson’s encompassing organizations. He 
premises his theory on the idea that popular cabinet support for the coalition executive leads to more 
inclusiveness in a particular government. Further, more interests encompassed within one coalition 
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governments or minority governments have few powers to alter budgetary 
policies due to lack of support (Tsebelis and Chang 2004). Powell (1982: 224)  
extends this further: “coalition or minority governments are much less likely to 
manipulate the economic cycles for electoral advantage than are those in 
countries with single party majorities or presidential executives”. In the latter type 
of systems Powell suggests there is an increased likelihood that the governing 
party will spend large amounts of money as an incentive to the prospective voter; 
the outcome of this action is often inflationary pressure. The combination of both 
the continuity of governance and the lower likelihood of the executive using 
expenditure while in office as a means of electoral promotion, results in lower 
inflation.   
 
Table 4.1 raises an interesting question about the implications of a large number 
of collective veto players in both cabinets and legislatures; it suggests coalition 
institutions are significantly correlated with lower inflationary levels. Conversely, 
systems with numerous parties may experience an increased level of inflationary 
pressure. Although this thesis examines the institutions and their correlations 
separately, logically, for there to be an increased likelihood of a coalition cabinet 
and lower inflationary levels, a large multi-party legislature is needed. Whatever 
the nature of the relationship (whether the link exists solely between number of 
parties and inflation, or cabinet structure is also an important factor) the 
                                                                                                                                                 
increases the likelihood that government will the support the general electorate through policies such as 
lower unemployment and better quality of living  (Crepaz 1996). 
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relationship points to another important condition in Asian party politics, party 
fragmentation48. 
  
Cohesive party systems – with lower levels of party fragmentation – are less 
likely to suffer from policy coordination problems. Haggard (1997) suggests that 
as a consequence of a small number of larger parties, there is a general push 
towards the centre and hence fewer differences between each major party’s 
policies49. However, Haggard points out that these parties, the product of this 
institution, are advantageous in terms of stable policy and better socioeconomic 
outcomes50. Specifically, the emergence of a crisis, strong popular support can 
enable relatively swift reactions in systems with few parties (See MacIntyre 
2001). Terra (2002: 281), suggests something similar, stating that the majority of 
successful economic development and low inflation has occurred in “two-party or 
dominant-party systems”.  
 
Extreme forms of party fragmentation may have a deleterious effect on the 
formation of socio-economic policy. Principally it indicates that policy coordination 
within parliamentary coalition governments is likely to be undermined by multiple 
veto-players within the executive. (Roubini and Sachs 1989a; Roubini and Sachs 
                                                 
48
 Haggard and Kaufman (1995) view political party issues as products of two factors party fragmentation, 
the effective number of parties in the legislature; and, ideological persuasion. However, the Asian setting is 
different in that the latter factor as little bearing and therefore most problems are assumed to be related to 
the first factor (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Blondel 1999).  
49
 Due the incorporation of a vast number of interests within these parties they are aptly termed “catch-all” 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1995) . 
50
 But due to the fine line between parties becoming either the government or opposition there is expected 
to be resistance to “reforms when these threaten patronage opportunities or remove protection from core 
constituent.” (Haggard 1997). Further, the semblance of strong political will against reform would 
precipitate the rejection of radical changes for a “more incremental approach” (Haggard 1997: 137). 
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1989b; Haggard 1997; MacIntyre 2001). Similarly, presidential systems can also 
suffer policy coordination problems; Mainwaring (1989) suggests that in 
comparison to parliamentarism, weaker parties in presidential legislative systems 
are less likely to cooperate with the government due to fixed-term elections, thus 
discounting a potential threat (negative voter reaction) but also allowing 
possibility of greater “legislative blackmail” by the smaller parties (Haggard 1997: 
135)51.  
 
Asian democracies are noted for a lack of ideological polarisation (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995; Blondel 1999). Thus the removal of such ideological conflict and 
the “absence of strong left or populist parties [means], the principal coordination 
problems [are] centred on the struggle for pork” (Haggard 1997: 136). As a result 
there is an increased likelihood of the multiple veto players competing for 
patronage within the legislature; however this type of non-partisan institution has 
potential to give rise to oversized coalitions. Although there are difficulties 
resulting from large numbers of rent-seekers in the legislature, it effectively 
ensures that the executive cannot necessarily favour one special interest due to 
a lack of support for alteration of budgetary restraints: no party will stay in the 
coalition if it perceives its interests to be threatened.   
 
In conclusion, both Table 4.1 and the literature point to large multi-party 
legislatures within Asian democracies as not conducive lower inflation levels. I 
                                                 
51
 The proviso for high number of effective parties in a party system is not necessarily a proportional 
representation system. In many instances the low levels of party institutionalization within nascent 
democracies can also produce an inordinate number of parties. 
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contend that a party-system with little ideological polarisation and high party 
fragmentation is related to increase inflation levels. In the case study below, 
South Korea started with a high inflation and large number of parties (3.5) but 
progressively had smaller inflationary scores and numbers of parties over 
subsequent electoral cycles.  
 
What table 4.1 does not show is the hypothesised correlation between the 
cameral index and inflation. Tsebelis and Chang (2004) suggest that this 
institution is useful in controlling the rate of inflation, however this relationship is 
not apparent in this sample. The authors contend that one of the second 
chamber’s strengths is to reduce inflationary pressure; whilst there does seem to 
be some variation, its lack of significance may indicate that within emerging 
Asian democracies there is less importance on curbing inflation particularly if 
there is good economic development occurring. 
 
Case Study: South Korea 
 
A prime example of Table 4.1 appearing in context is the South Korean 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Korean’) democratisation period. That country has a 
semi-presidential system with a unicameral legislature, a multiparty system and 
an executive that relies on legislative support52.  
                                                 
52
  A common characteristic of presidential cabinets are their tendencies to be elected from outside 
parliament, but generally from within the same party. In semi-presidential systems there are cabinets that 
duly reflect the strength of the legislature and can be considered cross-party coalitions.  In the South 
Korean example there are notable examples of the president inviting other parties into the executive in 
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Korea’s “Third Wave” democratisation  occurred with the 1987 election of Roh 
Tae-woo as its country’s first directly elected president; however the subsequent 
1988 National Assembly legislative elections saw a split of the vote four ways, 
with each party failing to secure a majority (Park 1988; Kim 1989; Lee 1990; Park 
2002). This new multi-party legislature, effectively a three-and-a-half party 
system, prompted the president’s Democratic Justice Party (DJP), Korea’s 
largest, to incorporate two parties into a coalition to secure a majority (Croissant 
2001).  The resulting inflation rate for the 1988-91 electoral cycle is slightly high 
(7.7%) (IMF 2006) even taking into account the oversized coalition and large 
number of parties; however the effects of these institutions becomes significant in 
later electoral cycles . Thus it is useful to use this cycle as a benchmark in 
regards to later electoral cycles, periods where the democratic tradition is 
presumably further entrenched. 
 
The next election in 1992 contained 2.7 parties with a newer one, the Unification 
National Party (UNP) garnering a small part of the national electorate (Croissant 
2001; Park 2002). The inflation score for this period was 5.5% (IMF 2006). Kim 
Young Sam’s presidential election win the next year destined this latter party to 
political oblivion (Park 2002). Shortly before the Fifteenth National election in 
                                                                                                                                                 
order to gain a majority in the legislature. Although many claim that this legislature suffers under a 
‘delegative presidency’ whereby the executive wholly wields all power, it is not surprising that without a 
majority in the legislature there is enough veto power imbued in the system to counter any ill-warranted 
move (Haggard 1997: 137) . I argue here that although the party system suffers from low-levels of 
institutionalisation their presence warrants significance particularly as democracy matures, for instance the 
last several electoral cycles has weakened the Korean executive somewhat. 
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1996, several of parties transformed, the Democratic Party (DP) became 
National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), DLP changed to the New Korean 
Party (NKP), and the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) was a breakaway section 
of the old DLP (Park 2002). Legislative election results saw the creation of larger 
number of effective parties than the prior electoral system, 3.1, and an electoral 
inflation cycle score of 4.4% (Croissant 2001; IMF 2006). However it was not until 
1997 presidential election that there was the first instance of a successful 
transition of executive power to the opposition. Again the emergence of a larger 
party-system ensured that no party enjoyed a majority within the legislature 
(Steinberg 1998; Park 1998/1999; Chung-si and Hoon 1999). The president’s 
party the NCNP could not command a majority even when in coalition 
arrangement with another party, prompting this country’s first minority 
government53.  
 
The Sixteenth National Assembly election in 2000 progressed along similar lines 
to the previous electoral cycle, however, the effective number of parties reduced 
to 2.4. The hybrid presidency continued with its minority government failing to 
secure a majority coalition in the legislature. One effect of this consistent 
consensus-style executive was presumably the lowering of inflation for another 
electoral cycle, 2003-4  (3.2%) (IMF 2006). Further the subsequent Seventeenth 
Assembly election in 2004 saw another minority coalition and the same number 
of effective parties in the legislature (2.4) (Carr 2007). Again for a fourth 
consecutive electoral cycle the inflation is lower at 3.2% (IMF 2006).  
                                                 
53
 This is applicable here due to the nature of the semi-presidential system (See Chapter Two). 
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In summary, contemporary electoral patterns and inflation rates in South Korea 
reflect the further entrenchment of democratic traditions. The initial cycles 
(between 1988 and 1995) saw an oversized coalition and subsequently a 
minimal-winning cabinet with 3.5 and 2.7 multi-party legislatures, the inflation 
decrease between the two cycles does support the theoretical ideas as to the 
effect that these institutions may indirectly have on the inflation. However, the 
last three cycles corroborate the results of the empirical analysis better, in which 
minority-led cabinets in tandem with smaller multi-party legislatures led to 
sustained periods of lower inflation.   
 
Unemployment 
 
Table 4.2 (below) shows the relationship between different institution types and 
unemployment rates.  The first noticeable trend is the coalition institution 
exhibiting a negative effect on the rate of unemployment (-0.784). Chapter Two 
hypothesised that consensus institutions, coalitions in particular, would have 
significant effects on lower unemployment rates, which are often an issue of 
contention for the general electorate (Crepaz 1996). Crepaz (1996) assigns 
coalitions the same effect as that of Olsen’s “encompassing institutions”54. An 
increased number of veto players within the decision-making process enhances 
the inclusiveness of public policy; more interests encompassed within a greater 
                                                 
54
 The general electorate may in this instance be those directly affected by the effects of unemployment. 
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organisation further multiples the likelihood that government will support the 
general electorate. 
 
The second noticeable point is the lack of significance between the effective 
number of parties and the rate of unemployment. Discussion in Chapter Two 
showed that both Tsebelis (1995) and Crepaz (1996) strongly concluded that this 
institution might be expected to reduces the rate of unemployment in a country. 
The premise is that, due to the large number of actors within the system, each 
viable party would be open to rent-seeking by particular sections of society, 
including those for whom employment was scarce. As a consequence the rate of 
unemployment would lower as the legislature increased. However, no significant 
correlation could mean that within the Asian democracies this particular theory 
does not apply, it may be a consequence of ideological polarisation present 
within their party-systems (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Blondel 1999). 
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Table 4. 1 Institutions and Rate of Unemployment 1986-2005 (%) 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition -0.784* 0.446 
Cameral Index 0.465 0.497 
Effective no. of Parties 0.445 0.357 
Disproportionality Index 0.027 0.117 
r²= 0.176 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=40 
  
Source: All data for all years except for Japan are from Asian Development Bank                                                          
Key Indicators Reports (2003a; 2006); Japan’s unemployment rates exported from the 
World Bank Development Indicators Online Database (2006). 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, the disproportionality index, the indicator for electoral 
systems, has little effect on unemployment. Like the hypothesised relationship 
with lower inflation, there is insufficient variation occurring within the countries to 
give rise to a significant correlation.  
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Case Study: Thailand 
 
Thailand provides a good example of the relationship between coalition 
governments and the rate of unemployment. Thailand is notorious for having 
short electoral cycles; one by-product of its fractious democratic history is a 
tendency for coalition governments (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005). Due to 
Thailand’s adoption of a parallel electoral system, and weak institutionalisation of 
party systems, the initial electoral cycles of democratic Thailand [1986-1994] was 
filled with lots of collective veto-players within the executive55. Consequently 
there has been an abundance of oversized executive coalitions and therefore 
according to the literature one should see several electoral cycles of low 
unemployment rates. 
  
Thailand’s first several electoral cycles had large oversized coalition executives 
but also low rates of unemployment56. Although the first electoral cycle (1986) 
was not purely democratic in the sense that prime minister was unelected, 
General Prem Tinsulanonda (Prem) nevertheless created a coalition government 
from the political parties operating within the legislature (Maisrikrod 2002). The 
average rate of unemployment for this electoral cycle was 4.1%; inevitably this 
                                                 
55
 A parallel electoral system is form proportional representation that operates along side an often smaller 
plural electorate. Unlike mixed-member proportion representation, this parallel system runs both forms of 
electoral system independently of each other; therefore neither has an effect on the other. 
56
 For the purpose of convenience I will examine only the governments that last longer than a year. 
Thailand was notorious for having short-lived governments, however I have normalised the effect to 
establish significant relationships between the coalition governments and the rate of unemployment 
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set the trend of low unemployment through oversized coalition and that became 
the initial starting point for Thailand’s new democratic tradition (ADB 2003a). 
 
The first wholly directly-elected executive was headed by Chatichai Choonhavan 
of the Chart Thai party in 1988 (Maisrikrod 2002). Heading an oversized cabinet, 
Chatichai and his government seem to have further lowered the rate of 
unemployment further, to 2.1% (ADB 2003a).  The subsequent 1992 election 
followed a brief interlude of a military junta when the Chatichai government was 
removed from power for alleged corruption (Sulistiyanto 2002). The election of 
1992 witnessed a pro-democracy political coalition gain government.57 The 
Democrat Party led by Chuan Leekpai, coordinated a minimal-winning political 
coalition that established political stability and continued Thailand’s low 
unemployment rate, 1.3% (Sulistiyanto 2002; ADB 2003a) . 
 
Thailand’s third major electoral cycle (1995) is the longest to date in its new 
democratic tradition. Spanning five years it incorporated the end of a virtuous run 
of successful economic development, the onset of the 1998 Asian Financial 
Crisis and Thailand’s consequent recovery. Because this thesis normalises the 
electoral cycles, there are two values for this cycle, 1995-97 and 1998-2000, 
however it does allow a comparison between before the crisis and afterwards. 
Indeed, the first half of the government period from 1995 onwards, Thailand 
                                                 
57
 The military coup leaders dissatisfied with the Chatachai government decided to create their own party 
and compete within their own style election. Their subsequent election and government of 1992 came 
under pressure from the general populace prompting the need for fresh elections the same year (Chung-si 
and Hoon 1999). 
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enjoyed an unemployment rate of 1%; post-crisis the unemployment rate was 
high 2.9%, but as we will see the figures from the next coalition government 
reduce this cycle average (ADB 2003a).  
 
In terms of political significance, Thaksin Shinawatra’s election as Prime Minister 
in 2001 was a watershed for Thai democracy. Elected with a huge popular 
mandate, Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) oversaw an oversized 
coalition government (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005). This is further reflected 
by the drop in the rate of unemployment for the electoral cycle (2%) (ADB 2006). 
The recent election in 2004 saw the TRT forming a minimal winning cabinet, for 
only the second time in Thai politics. However, the unemployment rate still 
continued to be lower (1.3%).   
 
In review, Thailand provides a clear illustration of Table 4.2 coalition composition 
correlation. Indeed, the Asian Financial Crisis aside, oversized coalitions are 
more likely to lower unemployment, prompting the question of what the legacy of 
Thaksin’s TRT minimal-winning cabinet will be on the legacy of low 
unemployment in Thailand. 
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Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Unlike inflation and unemployment indicators, very little institutional literature 
discusses the relationship between democratic institutions and foreign direct 
investment (‘FDI’).  Table 4.3 examines the strong positive relationship between 
the bicameral institution and FDI; suggesting countries with strong bicameralism 
may enjoy higher levels of foreign capital.58 Borrowing the concepts from 
Bradbury and Crain (2002) in terms of fiscal policy and those of Birchfield and 
Crepaz (1998) and  their sense of competitive veto players, it is possible to 
construct an argument that there is significant correlation between the two. I 
suggest that the competitive veto players in a medium-strong second chamber 
may stop governments from implementing nationalist-type policies which restrict 
the use of foreign capital.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 Before examining the countries below it is obvious that the development path of South Korean and 
Taiwan is considerably different than of Malaysia and Thailand (Sulistiyanto 2002). The former two 
countries rely heavily on domestic capital to spur economic performance yet both have unicameral 
legislatures compared to the medium-strong bicameral institutions employed in the latter two countries. 
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Table 4. 2 Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment 1986-2005 (%) 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition -0.088 0.233 
Cameral Index 1.23*** 0.26 
Effective no. of Parties -0.356* 0.187 
Disproportionality Index -0.008 0.061 
r²= 0.466 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=40 
  
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2006) 
 
What is interesting in the above figure is the apparent negative correlation 
between the effective number of parties and the level of FDI. Little existing 
literature accounts for the proposed link between this institution and the influx of 
foreign capital. However I propose that there is a premise for this relationship 
which has as its foundations the link between national identity and the successful 
Asian development plan, deemed by Booth (1999) as integral to success of 
Taiwan and South Korea economic development59. Indeed, the lack of 
ideological polarisation within Asian countries tends to lend itself towards strong 
leaders and/or populism. Many countries reject foreign capital as it is seen 
                                                 
59
 Booth (1999) suggests that one of the major factors to the economic success of both Taiwan and South 
Korea was their emphasis on domestic investment through gross domestic savings and not FDI.  
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(rightly or wrongly) a means of removing the ownership of national infrastructure 
from the people. These populist sentiments may be compounded in systems 
where there are large numbers of parties which are all effectively struggling for 
pork. When (relatively successful) economic development plans of neighbouring 
countries are seen to rely on gross domestic savings as an investment starter, 
opposition to FDI may become an enviable election platform (See Booth 1999).  
This trend is apparent within several of the South-East Asian countries, 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia [see below], particularly after the Asian 
Financial Crisis [1998]; however, no institutional literature has commented on the 
perceived relationship between the party-system and FDI levels. 
 
Case Study: Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is a prime example of the strong relationship between the cameral 
index and FDI.  Indonesia had been, until the 2004 election, effectively a 
unicameral legislature operating under the multiparty party system. The 1999 
election witnessed new systemic developments with the expansion of a larger 
party system within the unicameral legislature.  
 
In general, the trend in Indonesia prior to 2004 was essentially a two-and-a-half 
party system (1987 electoral cycle) and a 2.9 party system for both the 1992 and 
1997 electoral cycles.  With the exception of the middle electoral cycle levels of 
FDI were generally decreasing. The 1999 electoral cycle saw an increased 
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number of parties (5.5) and a dramatic drop in FDI (-1.22), effectively suggesting 
that a larger number of parties within a unicameral legislature restricts the influx 
of foreign capital. In contrast, in the subsequent 2004 election there were 
implemented constitutional changes to the main legislature: four senators would 
now be elected per province (Sherlock 2006). However the powers of the two 
chambers are asymmetrical therefore, according to Lijphart’s index, only warrant 
a score of three60. The result of this medium-strong bicameral chamber, despite 
the presence of a large multi-party lower legislature (7.0), is a sizeable increase 
in the FDI level (1.3%). Although the previous electoral cycles have seen the 
increase of parties and the lowering of FDI, this last electoral cycle [2004-] 
however, reaffirms the theoretical points made above; a medium-strong 
bicameral chamber is significantly correlated to increase foreign capital. 
  
Openness 
 
Table 4.4 examines the relationship between bicameralism and the openness 
index. There is little existing literature as to the nature of this relationship. 
However, similar comments can be made as to the relationship between 
bicameralism and openness as were made about the links between this 
institution and FDI. Within all economies there are certain industries that are 
liable to be challenged by foreign competition. Indeed, some of these threatened 
                                                 
60
 This score refers to the index defined in Chapter Three, whereby a medium-strong bicameral institution, 
a classification that lacks either symmetry or incongruence, is categorised as a three. In this instance it has 
less than equal powers that than the lower chamber, therefore it is deemed to be considered asymmetrical; 
whilst the election of four senators per province is incongruent because it over represents certain minorities. 
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industries may also be of great domestic importance (e.g. agriculture, 
manufacturing) and so carry undue influence with politicians. I have adopted 
Bradbury and Crain’s premise (2002) that the very notion of specific interests 
gaining protection runs counter to the idea of a strong second chamber which 
should ostensibly only for the broader public interest. In most countries the broad 
public interest is for a more open market and consequently cheaper goods: once 
established it becomes difficult to change the status quo, even if the effect of 
liberalisation is harm to domestic primary production industries (Tsebelis and 
Money 1997).  
 
Similarly, there is little literature explaining the correlation between the coalition 
institution and openness index. I propose that this relationship is a response to 
Crepaz’s (1996) encompassing interest, in that the easiest way to satisfy and 
reward rent-seekers is to protect their interests by having a lower openness 
index, thereby protecting national industries, jobs and livelihoods. As shown 
below, Thailand provides a prime example of institutions, bicameralism and 
coalitions in context.  
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Table 4.4 Institutions and the Openness Index 1986-2005 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition -15.409* 8.611 
Cameral Index 26.806* 9.582 
Effective no. of Parties -10.093 6.892 
Disproportionality Index 0.615 2.263 
r²= 0.35 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=40 
  
Source: Penn World Table (2004b) 
 
 
Case Study: Thailand 
 
The Thai senate is largely based on Westminster traditions. As noted above, 
some socioeconomic effects (including the openness index) can be in some way 
linked to the constitutional effects of changes to the senate. The 1997 
constitutional change had significant effects for Thailand; therefore it provides a 
suitable context for which to compare the senate’s strength before the 2000 
election and after it61. In addition Thailand has had significant experience with 
coalition governments, the formation of which incidentally was also affected by 
                                                 
61
 The constitutional changes only came into effect during the 2001 National Legislative Election. 
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the constitutional change; the effects of this can be clearly seen in Thaksin’s new 
party TRT, which built an incredible majority in two subsequent elections. 
 
Prior to the 1997 constitutional change, the indirectly elected senate had 
significant oversight powers, for instance they could reject or delay ordinary 
legislation and also vote on no-confidence motions (King 1999: 216). However I 
posit that the strength of the Thailand second chamber warranted a score of 
three of Lijpharts’s cameral index. This score of three (3.0) is due to the senate 
exercising symmetrical power  vis-à-vis the lower chamber however it classified 
as medium-strong due to it not having its members elected through 
incongruence. Overall the presence of an oversized cabinet in conjunction with 
the strong veto players in the senate could not restrict the level of openness in 
the tariffs. 
 
The new constitutional senate, although now directly elected, is (ironically) 
slightly less powerful, and unable to pass no-confidence motions (King 1999: 
216). This reduces the power of the senate over the House of Representatives, 
freeing up the latter to push through necessary legislation. The strength of the 
senate is now somewhat weaker than its counterpart legislature; therefore I posit 
that under the Lijphart scale, this upper chamber has a score of only two. The 
new constitutional amendment increased the democratic legitimacy of the senate 
but reduced its legislative power, therefore relegating to asymmetrical status; 
further the new nation-wide election of its members is a form of congruence and 
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therefore on the whole this is a weak chamber and warrants a score of only two. 
This phenomena coupled with a minimal-winning cabinet might be expected to 
give rise to policies which would reduce the openness index and prompt further 
protectionist laws.  
 
Indeed, prior to the constitutional change taking effect in 1997, but effectively not 
until the 2001 legislative elections, each of the normalised electoral cycles 
increase by ten Openness Index points (Penn World Table 2004b). The 
difference in score between the 2004 and 2001 electoral cycles is negligible, 
suggesting that the effect of the new senate is significant. In conclusion, 
Thailand’s political experience with two very different second chambers 
illustrated Table 4.4 results clearly; a medium-strong senate is correlated with a 
higher Openness Index. Conversely, the effect of this constitutional reform in 
regards to coalitions suggests that for the future, Thailand’s is less likely to have 
more increase in the Openness Index. 
 
GDP per capita 
 
In Chapter Two I discussed the implication of adding new socio-economic 
indicators to examine the established relationships; I now  go on to examine the 
four political institutions and GDP per capita. Although there was no specific 
literature that pertains to the significance this relationship, it stands to reason that 
the emerging success of these countries and indeed their increase in wealth is 
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due in some part to their political institutions. The existing literature suggests that 
institutions have varying effects on inflation, unemployment or income inequality.  
I suggest that it is likely that they can also affect the wealth of a country.  
 
Table 4.5 Institutions and GDP per capita (Log) 1986-2005 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition 0.136** 0.05 
Cameral Index -0.075 0.056 
Effective no. of Parties -0.109** 0.04 
Disproportionality Index -0.006 0.013 
r²= 0.41 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=40 
  
Source: Penn World Table (2004b) 
 
 
 
The economic performance analysis described in Table 4.5. exhibits two 
significant correlations. There is a significant positive correlation between 
coalition composition and GDP per capita; however, there is an equally strong 
negative correlation between the effective number of parties in the legislature 
and GDP. This suggests that the nature of the executive-legislative relationship is 
important in terms of economic outcomes.  Illustrations of this relationship could 
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include circumstances in which a large number of legislative veto players are 
included in a government coalition, for example the oversized coalitions in 
Thailand62. I contend that the interplay between these institutions influences the 
growth of GDP per capita, that successful economic development is likely to 
occur through a coalition cabinet with a few parties in the legislature, or through a 
minimal-winning cabinet presiding over a two-party system. 
 
The analysis shows a significant correlation between type of executive-legislative 
relations and a country’s wealth. The argument about their effects lies at the 
heart of the majoritarian-consensus debate, wherein on one hand there is a 
minimal-winning executive presiding over a small legislature, and at the other 
pole, an oversized coalition and its large multiparty legislature. Both types permit 
a uniform economic policy, much in the way that a two-party legislature creates 
“catch-all” interest parties that have policies that try to accommodate all their 
interests, so does oversized coalitions, particularly in their efforts to mediate 
between all the cabinet veto-players for a single agreed-upon fiscal policy.  In a 
way both types of system, despite their apparent differences, may create stable 
economic outcomes and as such can increase a country’s wealth.  But as the 
example below points out, a minority-led executive in a large multiparty 
legislature may face difficulties in attaining a high GDP per capita. 
 
 
                                                 
62
 I have not included the alternative style of executive-legislative relations due to it overstating the effect. 
That in the instance of a two-party legislature it is more than likely that there will only be a minimal-
winning cabinet and hence satisfy the logic of the balance needed between the legislative and the executive. 
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Case Study: Taiwan 
 
Taiwan’s democratisation is largely an examination of two halves, the first refers 
to the progression – between 1992 and 1999 – of the government from 
authoritarian towards democratic legitimacy; secondly, the election in 2000 of the 
first opposition president and the implementation of a French style semi-
presidential or hybrid system. The difference between the two periods in terms of 
GDP per capita is a useful comparison. 
 
The democratisation process proceeded relatively slowly in Taiwan insofar as full 
democracy was established later than other countries in this study. The 1992 
elections were the first open and free elections for all constituencies (Hsieh 
2002). Significantly, the winning party, the Kuomintang (KMT) headed the regime 
of the previous authoritarian government (Hsieh 2002). Huntington refers to the 
process as “transplacement”, in distinction to the widely conceived idea of 
“replacement” whereby “democratisation results from the opposition gaining 
strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses or is 
overthrown” (Huntington 1991: 142)63. Although not directly influential in the 
forming of cabinet, the fewer effective number of legislative parties and its 
general electoral majority ensured Kuomintang was able to secure a minimal 
winning cabinet. The GDP per capita for this electoral cycle 1992-94 was 
$13,549.82, the subsequent 1995 electoral cycle, which yielded a similar 
                                                 
63
 This is similar in the Korean case; their first democratically elected government post-authoritarian 
government was the same one of the previous regime. 
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electoral outcome, also saw an increase, $15,993.02 (Penn World Table 2004b). 
The 1998 cycle had a similar jump, $18,280.99, and also had a minimal winning 
cabinet with two and half party legislature (Penn World Table 2004b). The lack of 
veto-players in this majoritarian system was perhaps conducive to sustain 
economic development during the first three electoral cycles of democratisation. 
It would mean that policy could be created with little modifications and 
implemented swiftly due to few impediments.  
 
The 2000 Taiwanese presidential election saw a win by an opposition leader, 
Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian, in conjunction with the 
implementation of new constitutional legislation for the first time and this caused 
deadlock for the 2001 electoral cycle (Hsieh 2002). Recent constitutional reform 
established a semi-presidential system for the 2000 election under the guidance 
of then KMT President Lee Teng-hui (Wu 2000). Whilst under Lee’s 
administration the system ran smoothly, due his ability to dominate the premier 
by virtue of his party leadership of the legislative majority KMT. Problems arose 
when Chen assumed the presidency with a minority coalition in the legislative 
assembly (Lin 2003). The new reform essentially moved specific responsibilities 
away from the president to a premier – in the French system this is known as the 
Prime Minister – who in turn led the legislature. Chen’s problems were due to the 
legislature retaining significant veto power and then further compounded by a 
majority coalition hostile to the executive meant policy deadlock was in place for 
the 2000 electoral cycle.  
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Although the Chen had won the presidency in 2000 the legislature was awarded 
to the KMT in 2001 and their coalition partners the People First Party (PFP) also 
known as the “pan-Blue army” (Hsieh 2002). Interestingly enough the election of 
a partisan premier loyal to the DPP early after the 2001 election did not prompt a 
response from the pan-blue camp64. The effect was still significant, a minority 
cabinet in a three-and-a-half party system contributed to only a GDP per capita 
value of $ 19335.69, a markedly lower jump than the previous electoral cycles. 
The unwillingness of the president to elect an opposition party member to the 
premiership, and therefore another collective veto-player, may be correlated to 
the country’s small wealth increase.  
 
The subsequent 2004 legislative elections also saw an pan-blue majority ,albeit a 
small one, fail to place one of their own as premier (Hsieh 2006). The DPP ,a 
minority in the Legislative Yuan, formed a second minority cabinet (Hsieh 2006). 
The minority cabinet and another multiparty legislature (3.5) prompted a GDP per 
capita score of only $ 20239.93. Indeed, a second consecutive cohabitation 
electoral cycle reaffirmed Table 4.5 correlations, that a minority executive and a 
large multi-party legislature is unlikely to be wealth-maximising. What is suggests 
is that this government structure does not permit coalition building that is present 
                                                 
64
 The president can hand-pick their premiers, unusual for a semi-presidential system, generally this office 
is bestowed to the leader of the legislative majority. In this instance it is assumed that picking anyone other 
than this person reduces your power to implement policy. Moreover, it would prompt hostilities from the 
legislative majority, however, the pan-Blue army did not, fearing that a no-confidence vote against the 
executive on their behalf may prompt a fresh election and the possibility of a reduced majority (Hsieh 
2006). 
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in purely parliamentary institutions, for instance Japan and Thailand. At the risk 
of creating a fairer and more democratic legitimacy Taiwan has possibly 
hamstrung economic development through political immobility. The inability of the 
president to create a cabinet coalition with any of the parties in the legislature is 
may adversely affect better GDP scores in future electoral cycles 
 
In sum the effects of minority government in a large legislature lends itself to 
uncertain policy that may result in smaller GDP per capita increase each 
electoral cycle. Taiwan is therefore a prime example of the interplays between 
multiparty legislature and the executive. The first several electoral cycles imitate 
the correlation perfectly; a minimal-winning cabinet and fewer parties resulted in 
significant jumps in GDP per capita due to greater efficiency in implementation. 
In contrast, the establishment of a “cohabitation” government, indeed, a minority-
led executive facing a hostile and larger multiparty legislature, had significant 
negative effects for GDP per capita.  
 
Human Development Index 
 
This indicator is a composite index, made up of three different measurements, 
firstly, a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; secondly, 
knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross 
enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; lastly, a decent 
standard of living, as measured by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
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purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars (UNDP 2006). Chapter Two 
hypothesised broadly that electoral systems are influential in affecting the quality 
of life (Crepaz 1996). Currently, there is very little literature that directly confronts 
the issue of whether specific democratic institutions have correlations with this 
socioeconomic indicator. I contend that democratic institutions do have an 
indirect effect on the Human Development Index; however, the effect is 
potentially overshadowed by how much wealth each country enjoys, therefore 
skewing the results the richer countries. 
 
 
Table 4.6 Institutions and Human Development Index 1986-2005 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition 0.045** 0.019 
Cameral Index -0.02 0.019 
Effective no. of Parties -0.023** 0.01 
Disproportionality Index 0.003 0.004 
r²= 0.178 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=32; this sample lacks scores from Taiwan 
Source: United Nations Development Project (2006); Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific 
Countries (ADB: 2000;2002;2003;2004) 
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Table 4.6 shows that HDI scores are strongly correlated with cabinet 
composition.  This is in part perhaps due to the increased number of interests 
represented in the executive; Crepaz (1996) referred to such cabinets as 
“encompassing organisations” which acted and made decisions based on the 
expectation of their wider general interest. Therefore it is likely that coalition 
governments within East and South-East Asia would be expected to have spent 
larger sums of their budgets on improving health and education attainment levels 
on their populaces. However, a more likely reason than the direct effects of 
education and health funding is the increasing wealth of the country leading to 
better HDI scores. As a matter of common sense, the larger the GDP per capita 
of the country then the better the HDI score. Appendix I shows the regression of 
all seven countries GDP scores with the rest of the independent variables. The 
inclusion of this additional indicator suggests that the wealthier the country the 
more likely it is to have a higher HDI index, significant to the 0.01 percentile. 
Interestingly, this regression suggests that there is a negative influence of the 
disproportionality index significant to the 0.05 percentile. That in electorates 
where there are disproportionate differences between the number of seats 
appropriated by a party and their respective number of votes could adversely 
affect their HDI index. GDP variation alone may in fact account for most of the 
variation of the HDI results, however, even in developed democracies; there is a 
considerable difference in the HDI levels. Indeed, the top three rankings – 
Iceland, Norway and Australia – of the United Nations Development Programme 
HDI rankings are occupied by coalition governments, two of which have GDP per 
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capita scores significantly less than that of the richest country the United States 
of America (UNDP 2006). I think that a country’s wealth is strong contributing 
factor to its quality of life/HDI score as seen in Appendix I however this should 
not discount the influence of the coalition institution. I contend further, that 
between developing economies, particularly South-East Asian countries, the 
variation between these may be related back to their cabinet composition rather 
than their wealth. 
 
Case Study: Japan, South Korea and Thailand 
 
All three countries have recent experience of both minimal winning and oversized 
coalition cabinets and also have enjoyed increased wealth and consequently 
better HDI scores65. The increases in the scores are more noticeable during or 
immediately after a coalition led cabinet66. What is noticeable, however, is the 
effect that this type of institution has had on the only developed democracy in the 
sample, Japan. After several decades of an unchanging minimal-winning cabinet, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan has had several electoral cycles of 
oversized coalitions (Klein 2001). Starting, from 1993, their first oversized 
coalition, there have been five cycles of sizeable increases in the HDI scores 
                                                 
65
 This indicator is calculated as a fraction and therefore the incremental jumps between electoral cycles, 
although small numbers, in fact represent large differences. For instance a 0.05 jump in HDI over several 
years can mean a substantial increase in standard of living or the increase of life expectancy, or the increase 
of education enrolments. Therefore, it is unlikely that will be a huge increase from one year to the next, 
even over several years, hence it is significant if there are changes of 0.05 as opposed to 0.03.  
66
 In this instance I still refer to minority cabinets as a form of coalition cabinet. 
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compared to several modest increases in the cycles prior to the removal of LDP 
from government (UNDP 2006).  
 
The developing democracies have experienced remarkable development. 
Thailand in particular is a clear example of oversized coalitions and excellent 
economic performance with large increases in HDI scores. Prior to the 1998 
Asian Financial Crisis Thailand had several electoral cycles of oversized coalition 
cabinets, and in each cycle there was good human development with an average 
increase of 0.052 HDI points (ADB 2000; ADB 2001; ADB 2002; ADB 2003b; 
ADB 2004; ADB 2005; UNDP 2006). Post-crisis , irrespective of the reduced 
economic development, HDI levels remain largely unaffected and are still 
increasing at an average 0.09 points per cycle (ADB 2000; ADB 2001; ADB 
2002; ADB 2003b; ADB 2004; ADB 2005; UNDP 2006). This is in stark contrast 
to the Indonesian and Filipino minimal-winning cabinets whose unremarkable but 
steady development pre-crisis was largely non-existent post-crisis. Indeed, 
recent Thai HDI scores are comparatively lower in relation to earlier electoral 
cycles, and I contend this may in part be due to the electoral dominance of 
Thaksin’s TRT party.  
 
The last example, South Korea, has had superior economic development 
coupled with a fluid political development. During the first three electoral cycles of 
their democratisation, this country had had all three forms of coalition cabinets 
successively – the 1988-91 cycle was an oversized cabinet; the 1992-95 cycle 
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was a minimal-winning, and; the 1996-99 cycle was a minority coalition. In this 
time its HDI score jumped 0.057 points; the remaining two electoral cycles has 
seen minority cabinets and an increase of 0.03 HDI points (ADB 2000; ADB 
2001; ADB 2002; ADB 2003b; ADB 2004; ADB 2005; UNDP 2006).  
  
Income Inequality 
 
There is a strong positive correlation between cameral index and the two income 
inequality measures67. The results shown in tables 4.7 and 4.8 below corroborate 
Crepaz and Birchfield’s (1998) findings in respect to bicameralism. Whereas 
other forms of consensus democracy (i.e. multi-party legislatures and oversized 
coalitions) appeared to generate income equality, the effects of bicameralism 
seemed to further inequality. This illustrates the argument by Bradbury and Crain 
(2002) which I described in Chapter Two; competitive veto players in a second 
chamber are less likely to change economic policy for the purpose of wealth 
redistribution with an intention to favour a particular group68. In the same vein, 
Tsebelis and Money (1997) suggest that even where there is a strong majority in 
the lower legislature, it can do little to alter the policy status quo if the second 
chamber decides that it is not the best interests of the general electorate to do 
so. This probably accounts for the very significant positive correlation between 
the strength of bicameralism and the level of income inequality. However, this 
does not account for the policies that a strong second chamber does allow; 
                                                 
67
 The two income measures refer to the top decile percentages and CIA Gini scores respectively. The 
measures are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Three.  
68
 This can also be termed as rent-seeking behaviour. 
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presumably if applying the logic stated before, this institution may perceive that 
some legislation does benefit the general electorate and as unintended 
consequence reduces income inequality. Hence in some case studies income 
inequality does reduce between electoral cycles. 
  
Table 4.7 Institutions and Top Decile's Share of Gross National Income 1986-2005 (%) 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition -0.269 0.865 
Cameral Index 6.847*** 0.876 
Effective no. of Parties 0.802 0.59 
Disproportionality Index 0.047 0.223 
r²= 0.87 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=22 
  
Source: World Income Inequality Database (WIDER 2007) 
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Table 4.8 Institutions and Gini Coefficients 1986-2005 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition -0.398 1.955 
Cameral Index 4.193*** 1.287 
Effective no. of Parties -0.879 1.444 
Disproportionality Index -0.118 0.44 
r²= 0.444 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=22 
  
Source: Central Intelligence World Factbook (1999; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2007) 
 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 both attempt to crudely demonstrate the same concept, 
namely, income inequality. This indicator is commonly described using two tests, 
the first (shown in Table 4.7) share held by the top ten percent of the population 
of the Gross National Income; the second indicator (Table 4.8) is the Gini 
Coefficient score.  This is best described as a Lorenz Curve, whereby the 
inequality is measured as an index score calculated using all of the population. 
The fact that both measures yield highly significant results confirms that the 
presence of a bicameral institution is pertinent for levels of income inequality.  
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Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show that neither coalition nor party system institutions have 
an effect on the level of income inequality within the sample. This is perhaps 
surprising considering the emphasis placed upon these institutions by Birchfield 
and Crepaz (1998). Although in many of the countries there is higher quality of 
life, much of this is to do with sustained economic development rather than 
government type. However, a theme that pervades many emerging Asian 
democracies is the lack of strong social links or collaborations between 
grassroots groups and electoral parties. Because of the absence of left wing or 
socialist parties (which would ordinarily campaign for income equality and 
redistributive policies) the whole political system is in consensus about the 
desirability of sustained economic development. This may therefore be a 
situational example of emerging Asian democracies not illustrating the same 
characteristics of their developed OECD counterparts. If this is the case then 
Birchfield and Crepaz’s (1998) hypothesised effects for coalition and multi-party 
systems for lowering income inequality within OECD countries cannot be held 
over for these developing democracies.   
 
Case Study: Philippines 
 
The Philippines is a prime example of a medium-strong bicameral institution 
affecting the income dispersion in an economy. Although the data for both its 
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decile scores and the CIA Gini coefficients are incomplete, their both reflect a 
general trend of high levels of inequality.  
 
According to Lijphart’s cameral index, the Philippines’ senate receives a score of 
three; this is due to its symmetrical powers but also congruent election of its 
senators (Croissant 2003). I contend that this medium-strong institution is 
responsible for restricting the redistribution of income to the lower socio-
economic groups. Thus, it is unlikely that policies in regards to the social welfare 
of citizens passed by the lower house are affirmed by the senate. 
 
One explanation for this is the large number of poor and disenfranchised persons 
living outside the main urban areas. The major stumbling for block to 
development for many of these people is the unwillingness by the political elite, 
mainly the proportionally-elected senate, to initiate land reform (Gerson 1998; 
Guzman 2007). Senate campaigns are expensive, hence, much of the upper 
house members are in some way linked to the urban population and rich land 
owners who benefit from the current lack of land reform, because these are the 
persons who can afford to run (or sponsor) senators (Gerson 1998; Guzman 
2007). Indeed, many reports about the Philippines list this country as having the 
worst levels of income inequality in South-East Asia (Gerson 1998; Guzman 
2007).  This historical data seems to affirm the correlations of Table 4.7 and 4.8; 
from 1992-94 electoral cycle to the 1998-2000 cycle their Gini Coefficient score 
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jumped from 33.5 to 39.3 (CIA 1999; CIA 2003)69. This increase of inequality was 
largely based in the Philippines rural districts  whilst amid the growing calls for 
greater land reform to raise people out of poverty (Guzman 2007). Although 
bicameral institutions are strongly correlated with the two indicators of income 
inequality, Tables 4.7 and 4.8; and the historical situation lends itself towards 
confirming this correlation, it is simpistic to suggest that other economic forces 
have not affected this situation. MacIntyre (2001) considered the Filipino 
government ill-equipped to deal with the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. It was 
emphasised that the country’s hesitation over the correct legislation delayed 
important economic policy being implemented and as a result a serious 
economic downturn was experience in the Philippines (MacIntyre 2001). Indeed, 
this crisis no doubt created further hardship and therefore larger inequality, but it 
is also makes it harder to determine whether Table 4.7 and 4.8 correlations 
adequately explain the relationship.   
 
Summary 
 
This thesis is an exploratory study into the effects of democratic institutions on 
economic development in nascent democracies. The results outlined in this 
chapter provide a crude assessment of the viability of four institutions in relation 
to seven socio-economic indicators. Indeed, despite limited number of cases and 
                                                 
69
 Gini Coefficients are a statistical tool to analyse the proportion of Gross National Income the wealthy 
citizens enjoy over the poorer ones. In short, a lower coefficient score, for instance Taiwan’s 24, suggests 
there is very little income inequality present. Moreover within the developed countries Japan, Taiwan and 
South Korea, their scores fluctuate up to 1.0 over any three electoral cycles. Therefore in this instance a 
jump of 5.8 coefficients, from an already inequitable position represents a significant change.  
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control variables, the results point to interesting relationships between various 
political institutions and economic preferences. More importantly, this analysis 
suggests that further in-depth and systematic study and research is required in 
order to provide greater understanding of the role democratic political institutions 
have on economic performance.  
 
However, several conclusions can be made from the results. This analysis has 
provided some interesting relationships (and omissions) that warrant comment. 
In general the hypotheses regarding inflation and unemployment hold true in new 
Asian democracies. Consensus institutions, specifically minority and oversized 
coalition cabinets, are significantly correlated with the reduction of inflation and 
unemployment. Further, the hypothesised relationship between medium-strong 
bicameral institutions and higher income inequality was also shown to be highly 
significant in my sample. There were also several expected relationships which 
did not appear in the data. Notably, bicameralism was considered to be relevant 
to lower rates of inflation; however Table 4.1 shows that there was no significant 
relationship between these variables. Consensus institutions were expected to 
reduce income inequality; however, neither cabinet composition nor party 
systems had significance for that indicator.  
 
The inclusion of several other socio-economic indicators not previously 
investigated has produced some interesting results. Foremost of these new 
relationships is that between bicameral institutions and FDI, and to a lesser 
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extent the openness index. Both these indicators represent two factors integral to 
the unique and successful economic development of these Asian democracies 
(Booth 1999). I contend that the highly significant correlation between 
bicameralism and FDI is descriptive of the political differences between the 
relatively successful economic East Asian democracies and their South-East 
counterparts70. Further research could possibly shed light on the specific role this 
institution has in shaping economic development.  
 
Coalition cabinets provide the other interesting new relationship; minority 
cabinets and oversized coalition cabinets appear to be significantly correlated 
with HDI. I contend that although this socio-economic indicator is probably highly 
influenced by the wealth of the country, GDP per capita, there are discernable 
differences in those whom had minimal-winning cabinets compared to other two 
forms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 In this instance, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan 
 106 
Chapter Five – Conclusion 
 
This thesis has conducted an exploratory study into the effect of democratic 
political institutions on economic performance. Chapter Two evaluated major 
scholarly work, conducted principally by Lijphart and other neo-institutionalist 
theorists, on the implications of specific democratic institutions. This research 
has advanced the existing literature, most of which is premised on industrialised 
developed democracies, by considering whether the theories hold true when 
applied to nascent democracies of East and South-East Asia.  
 
Research Findings 
 
Chapter Two outlined several of the main hypotheses derived from study of 
industrialised democracies. To these hypotheses and their associated socio-
economic data I added several other performance indicators.  These included 
general indicators of economic and social development, and also some factors 
which are related to unique features of Asia’s growth, such as low levels of FDI. . 
The hypothesised relationships between political institutions and performance 
indicators generally held true, however there were some interesting exceptions 
and several new correlations were revealed. 
 
Lijphart (1999) contended that states with consensus institutions, proportional 
electoral systems, multiparty legislatures, coalition executives and strong 
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bicameral institutions have equal or in some instances better economic 
performance than their majoritarian counterparts. Further, Birchfield and Crepaz 
(1998) argued that both multiparty legislature and coalition executives reduce 
inflation, unemployment and income inequality whilst maintaining a higher 
standard of democracy.   
 
Most of the hypotheses concerning consensus style governance hold true in the 
South-East Asian sample used in this thesis.  However, some inconsistencies 
are apparent.  The most noticeable of these is the aggregate effect of multiparty 
legislatures. Both inflation and unemployment performance indicators illustrated 
the counterbalancing effect resulting from a large multiparty system, particularly 
in regards to an oversized coalition executive, in many instances the former 
institution has had correlations running directly opposite to the latter institution. 
This suggests that although compromise amongst veto players within an 
executive can have the desired effect on the particular institution e.g. a coalition 
cabinet reducing inflation levels, high level of party fragmentation within Asian 
democracies is inherently disadvantageous for specific economic performances 
such as inflation. It has even been suggested that too much democracy in the 
sense that consensus style creates further legitimacy through compromise is 
perhaps a disincentive for economic development (Barro 1997). 
 
Although Lijphart classified bicameralism as a form of consensus institution, it is 
a different type vis-à-vis multiparty legislatures and coalition executives due to 
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types of veto players operating within it. Chapter Two explained that the former 
institution is made up of competitive veto players intent on maintaining the status 
quo, while coalition executives are collective veto players and usually able to 
reach compromise. True to form, this hypothesised outcome was indicated in the 
data; medium-strong bicameralism was correlated with high levels of income 
inequality. I contended that this was due to the inability of lower chambers to 
push rent-seeking legislation through the upper chamber, often due to its 
different electoral and power structure. But the glaring omission in this area was 
the absence of the expected correlation between any of the other three collective 
institutions – party system, coalitions and electoral systems – and income 
inequality. Birchfield and Crepaz (1998) stated that the role of these institutions 
was essential to the income equality, however it is clear that this is not significant 
for Asian developing democracies. 
 
The new relationships between strong bicameral systems and economic 
indicators (both FDI and openness) also warrant comment. There was a 
significant positive relationship between both these variables and this institution. 
These indicators describe key elements in the successful economic development 
of Asian countries. Booth (1999) stipulates that low levels of FDI into both South 
Korea and Taiwan encourage high domestic saving which in turn spurred 
investors to use local capital as opposed to foreign sources. South-East Asian 
countries have to a certain extent followed a similar developmental path. I 
contend that medium-strong bicameral governments indirectly affect investment 
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availability, favouring more-easily-accessed foreign capital rather than (as in the 
Filipino government) prejudicing against FDI because of nationalistic sentiments. 
Further, the openness index examines the extent of tariffs restricting the amount 
of imports, a policy that favours specific industries; as for wealth distribution and 
FDI, this bicameral institution in its strong form does away with industry 
protection making all goods accessible for the consumer.  
 
Surprisingly there was no significant relationship between electoral systems and 
socio-economic performance. The current literature heavily emphasises the role 
of this institution in affecting socioeconomic performance. This may well be true.  
I suggest that the absence of a correlation is in fact due to the lack of variation 
amongst my sample. For statistical correlations to gain any significance there 
needs to be differences amongst each independent variable. In my sample 
proportional representation was almost the sole electoral type. Therefore, as a 
consequence of there being no valid comparators, there seems to be no 
significant relationship. 
 
Research Limitations 
 
There is very little literature existing that surveys the same scope or theoretical 
understanding that this research attempts. Indeed, the nature of the research 
attempted to implement a framework uplifted from surveys of developed 
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industrialised democracies and not specifically for nascent developing Asian 
democracies.   
 
Foremost within this research is the utility of the statistical analysis as a means to 
illustrate the relationships between our institutions and socio-economic 
performance. Due to the limited nature of the variables – the small number of 
countries, the limited years of democratic elections and a lack of control variables 
– conclusions drawn from this analysis must be made with an awareness of its 
parameters71. What is important is the significance of the direction derived from 
the correlations. Repeating what was stated in the previous chapter’s conclusion, 
this exploratory thesis purports to examine new relationships within the Asian 
context. Irrespective of this research’s reduced capacity to predict with 
confidence the size and direction of the relationship it allows some important 
general conclusions. Foremost, is the viability of these institutions in other similar 
analyses, meaning, that if significant relationships are found the relationship will 
still hold when tested with addition institutional variables, cases and controls. 
Conversely, in the first instance where no significant relationship is derived, the 
likelihood of a further specific in-depth analysis ascertaining any correlation is not 
probable.  
 
 
                                                 
71
 I contend here that there are a number of control variables that could be used to explain 
away inconsistencies. For instance the influence of colonialism, American, European and 
Japanese; other control variables include the ethnic homogeneity and proximity of 
countries to the tropics.  
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Possible Avenues for Further Research 
 
There is significant potential for further research in this field. Very little similar 
research has been conducted using these countries and this analytical 
framework.  
 
Foremost among potential research topics is a closer examination of 
bicameralism and its effects on socio-economic performance. The current 
literature does not adequately address the significance of this institution in 
developing democracies. This thesis has hinted at the significant effect it may 
have on socio-economic indicators; further evaluation in relation to its 
relationships with other indicators in my opinion merits extensive review.  
 
Secondly, there is room to synthesise the quantitative work in this thesis will 
alternative analytical frameworks for institutions, in particular work that examines 
the quality of institutions.  Olson (1996) suggests much of the potential growth 
that can be accrued is lost through inefficient institutions. While my work has 
focussed on the characteristics of institutions, Olson and others seek to assess 
implementation and efficacy institutions. The corollary of this is that although 
characteristics may indicate the presence or absence of certain factors, they do 
nothing to describe performance (Aron 2000). Research into a direct relationship 
between institutions and growth has found that there is little significance, 
however Aron points out that there is a case for indirect correlation measured by 
 112 
effect of institutional quality on the volume of investment. This would warrant 
further examination under a rubric which encompasses both characteristics and 
qualities of institutions. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
Lijphart and other neo-institutionalists have long promoted the economic viability 
of democratic systems in developed andindustrialised countries, however little 
has been made of the import of democracy for developing nations. This thesis 
has sought to examine and evaluate established hypotheses in a variety of 
similar countries, the majority of which are considered to be part of the “Third 
Wave” of democratisation (Huntington 1991). I also attempted to introduce new 
socio-economic indicators to explore other potential relationships; the result 
being some new and interesting relationships as well as some surprisingly strong 
hypothesised ones as well.  Whilst this thesis has not attempted to definitively 
ascertain which institutions contribute to specific economic performance, it has 
prompted new directions for future research particularly into the rise of 
democratic institutions in East and South-East  Asia.  
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Appendix I 
 
Appendix I Institutions and HDI and additional GDP per capita   
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standard Error 
Institutions 
    
Coalition Composition (-)0.011 0.012 
Cameral Index 0.007 0.014 
Effective no. of Parties (-)0.009 0.007 
Disproportionality Index (-)0.005** 0.003 
GDP per Capita 0.264*** 0.039 
r²= 0.647 
  
* p<.01   **p<.05   *** p<.01 
 
Note: n=32 
  
Source: United Nations Development Project (2006); Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific 
Countries (ADB: 2000;2002;2003;2004)  
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